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The Petraeus Report - Implications for Iraq

By Gareth Stansfield, Associate Fellow, Middle East Programme, Chatham House

We should not be too surprised by the Petraeus verdict. He is, after all, a military figure obliged to serve his civilian masters. By maintaining a positive spin (if somewhat nuanced) his views are in keeping with the proclamations emanating from a White House that is increasingly divorced from reality and ignoring the negative findings of other government offices and independent analysts alike. It is clear that Iraqi security is something of an oxymoron.

Yet, if Petraeus is bound to an official line, he is also required to respond to the needs of his forces in Iraq - particularly in terms of preserving their morale - and in ensuring that areas in which the US has not succeeded will be focused upon. He is also committed to following through with actions already decided - armies are complex organizations that need time to plan, implement, and reconsider. These tensions are apparent in the report. While Petraeus talks of the withdrawal of a brigade - the return of some 4,000 soldiers from a current total of 160,000 is little more than symbolic. Even if they are brought down to 130,000, this is still equivalent to the position at the beginning of 2007 - therefore, hardly a draw-down.

Petraeus talks of improvements in security caused by the surge, but the evidence suggests otherwise. Virtually every other source points to an increase in deaths during the surge - perhaps by as much as 5% and, even more worrying for the scholar-warrior, fears that the Iraqi military is still a year to 18 months away from being able to operate independently from the US military and therefore be effective. Incidentally, this timeframe seems to remain constant, whether considering the Iraqi military in 2005, 2006, or 2007. There can be little confidence in US government or military announcements concerning projections of future security in Iraq.

Petraeus has had to show progress by putting into place a strategy for a cautious troop withdrawal. But, he is also painfully aware - perhaps more than most - that it is only the presence of his forces that is preventing the final fall of the Iraqi government; the Balkanization of Iraq; and the ignominious conclusion to the US hope of democratizing Iraq at the barrel of a gun.

Implications within Iraq

The report will do little to calm the nerves of an Iraqi government that fears for its future survival. As Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki is clearly out of favour with the US government and must be viewing plans that seek to distance Washington from the catastrophe that is Iraq with no small degree of suspicion. Indeed, it is very possible that the scapegoat for the failure to stabilise Iraq's security situation will be the Iraqi government, and then Iraqis themselves, for supposedly failing to take advantage of the hard-won opportunities presented to them by US sacrifices.

The danger is now that the more powerful political players in Iraq will see Petraeus's report as the first clear sign that the US is planning to withdraw some time in the near future. While the US has been in Iraq, there has been little incentive to move quickly to resolve the thorny political differences that exist between the key players. The status quo - while not being ideal - has been viewed as better than having to negotiate, while the failure to agree has been blamed on the unsuitable situation in Iraq, caused by the presence of the liberators/occupiers.

With no Americans in Iraq, there will be no one else to blame, and no one to turn to when negotiations fail and guarantees about the future need to be made. Positions between groups may harden, and the tensions that exist within communities may come to the fore as the pressure to carve out positions of undisputed leadership becomes more intense.

The withdrawal of the British from Basra, for example, could easily see the simmering discord between the SIIC and the Sadr Movement erupt into full-scale conflict. Similarly, the under-reported fighting between radical Sunni groups and less-radical Sunni groups could be magnified by the possibility of the withdrawal the US. In the north, the Kurds will undoubtedly have major concerns about the US leaving Iraq, particularly as none of the major issues concerning them (particularly the status of Kirkuk, and their own autonomous existence) have been agreed in concrete terms.

In sum, Petraeus's report will do little to make the key Iraqi political players feel more secure about themselves, and each other. Sunnis, Shi'a, and Kurds will have to review their own positions and there could well be a period of chaotic fighting within these groupings as the new political landscape is formed. Following this, it is easily possible that, far from pursuing political means to secure their position in the state, they will seek to create realities on the ground that threaten the continued existence of Iraq itself.

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