



Transcript

Managing Global Insecurity

Keynote speaker: Rt Hon David Miliband MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Respondents: Sandy Berger, Chairman, Stonebridge International; former US National Security Advisor

Thomas Pickering, Vice Chairman, Hills & Company; former US Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Bruce Jones, Director, Center on International Cooperation, New York University

Stephen J Stedman, Senior Fellow, Center for International Security Cooperation, Stanford University

Chairs: Dr Robin Niblett, Director, Chatham House

Carlos Pascual, Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution

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Robin Niblett:

Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to Chatham House, I'm Robin Niblett, director of the Institute. It's my great pleasure to be able to welcome to Chatham House the Foreign Secretary. I will let my colleague here from the Brookings Institute, Carlos Pascual, do the introductions in a minute. First, Foreign Secretary, we're delighted to have you here and in a slightly different format to the last time you were here a year and a half ago – a slightly more open Chatham House space. What we're doing today is Chatham House is helping three institutions in the US that have taken really over a year, year and a half now, to produce both a report that came out in September and now a book entitled the *Power and Responsibility: Building International Order in an Era of Transnational Threats*. This is a co-operation between the Brookings Institute, and we have Carlos Pascual the Vice-President for Foreign Policy there; the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, we have Bruce Jones from that institution; and the Center for International Security Cooperation, Stanford University, from where we've Steve Stedman.

So gentlemen, over to you. I'll let Carlos do the other introductions for Tom Pickering and Sandy but we're delighted to be able to have you here with us and join you in launching this book at this particularly interesting and important moment with the change of leadership that has taken place in the United States.

Now, I'm meant to do a sort of run down on the topics that crept up this morning because we did have a chance to have a smaller conversation with some of the members of these three institutes and also with Tom and Sandy and I'm just going to say four or five telegraphic points which might then serve as part of the discussion. One of the big questions is, are we at a moment now in 2009 that has any resemblance to the 1940s and '50s where it was possible to make some really fundamental changes to international institutions? Is this financial crisis the type of crisis that leads people to make the very tough choices which would be needed to make international institutions more effective? In particular there are these so-called 'veto-wielding' states out there and the question is 'Is China a partner state, or potentially a veto-wielding state?' The same might be asked of Russia.

That was part of the conversation we had today. We also talked a bit about how you get from a G8 to a G20: is that a sequential thing, are these complimentary institutions? How does one divvy up the agendas between the

G20 or whatever amount it might be (the report talks about a G16), and the G8 which has obviously built up some norms and practices of operation.

Finally we talked a bit about the European Union which doesn't get such a big mention in the report but I think it was Sandy Berger who said 'remember the EU is an institution we work quite well with' and we didn't have to talk about it that much because we wanted to talk about institutions that might be more difficult to reform and adapt for the future.

And finally Foreign Secretary from your point of view one of the questions did come up about the role of the State Department and if we're going to create this new vision what can be done for it? And all sorts of amounts of money were mentioned being added to the State Department budget as part of this process, so, something that might come up again.

David Miliband:

The 'special relationship' doesn't extend to the state department funding us.

Robin Niblett:

Let me hand over first to Carlos Pascual to introduce the book and then he'll pass on to the Foreign Secretary. Delighted to have you here.

Carlos Pascual:

Robin, thank you very much, and we're very indebted to you and to Chatham House, and David Manning thank you very much as well, for helping make this possible and for allowing this discussion. As Robin said, this book *Power and Responsibility* is something we've spent a couple of years on... It's a book that's premised on the recognition that in the world we live in today capital and ideas and people move across boundaries, and the positive side of that has brought to the world tremendous wealth and prosperity in ways we've never known. Yet the negative side of this has led to an emergence of transnational threats such as nuclear proliferation, climate change, the threat of disease, the spread of conflict across borders, the kind of financial instability that we face today, the kind of transnational terrorism that has struck at the heart of this city and in the US. Now, how do we govern the fact that there are these problems, as Kofi Annan said some time ago, that do not have passports?

In doing this, something we quickly realized was that this was way too hard a problem to figure out by ourselves and we reached out to a number of expert

advisors who could help us and give us guidance, for instance our friends here Sandy and Tom. Sandy Berger was my boss at the National Security Council when he was National Security Advisor to Bill Clinton and he gave me lots of advice many times, most of it friendly but not all of the time and I always knew he was my boss. I'm very glad and pleased that he's here because Sandy is one of the sharpest thinkers we have in American foreign policy and his expertise and thinking on the Middle East has been hugely valuable to us in the US.

Tom Pickering is really sort of the model of the diplomat in the American Foreign Service. This man has served in more postings as ambassador than anyone can imagine, I think the number is 11. He's served in a few minor places including being permanent representative at the UN, India, Russia and a whole host of other places as well. His understanding and expertise of how the world works has been hugely valuable to us. We've benefited from a range of other international experts as well, including Xavier Solana who, on theme of the EU, has been a participant in the book, and we've had people from China, India, Africa, Latin America and certainly from a bipartisan perspective in the US.

One of the things we recognized in addressing these types of threat is that no one country can actually resolve these problems on its own, and nor can any one country actually isolate itself from them and retreat from them, and hence the kind of language we start seeing from President Obama about how American security is completely intertwined with global security. It's true for the US and it's true for the rest of the world. What it means for the US, and we try and stress this in the book, is that we need to change the perspective of leadership. As we worked on this research it was clear the international community was looking for the US to re-engage, but to re-engage on a world-based international system; not unilaterally deciding what the US would do, but establishing international co-operations and partnerships as that is the only way you can actually achieve effective results. As part of these international co-operations and partnerships it also means drawing in those emerging powers, because there is a greater diffusion of power today throughout the universe. We have this irony where we find the US in this extraordinary deficit situation and where this deficit is being financed by China. If you thought about that in the 1990s one would have thought that this is an impossible situation and hence, the difference in the kind of world we live in today. This necessitates bringing in those emerging powers to incorporate them into institutions and hence the discussion of why expand the G8 into something broader; hence the discussion of expanding the permanent

security council - not simply because it may be the right thing to do, but because if we want to achieve effective policy we need to broaden those institutions in order to be able to address the kind of inter-related threats we face in the international environment today.

It brings us back to the point that we underscore in the book, that we need to look at sovereignty a bit differently: not just about how nations behave toward their own people, but in fact how we take responsibility for the actions that we take and how they influence others around the world and how we work together to build the capability of weak states, and in this sense it's particularly important that we get to have this dialogue with David Miliband, the British Foreign Secretary. He has used this term 'responsible sovereignty' many times in his policy discussions, here and in China in particular. Steve and I were in China just shortly after your visit there and the term 'responsible sovereignty' and the way you used it was still reverberating extremely effectively.

But it's also become more complicated with the global recession we have today. As we talk about responsibility of states, we have increasing poverty within states and tensions within states, which can lead to the threat of protectionism and can in fact make it extremely difficult for the international system to move forward.

And hence Secretary Miliband as we move on to you and your comments some of the things we'd very much be interested in hearing is how do you think about 'responsible sovereignty' in the context of the global recession we're facing today? How do we hang on to that concept? A topic you have cared about very deeply, especially in your previous role as environment minister, how do we apply it to climate change still? Especially, as you know as well as anyone, the importance of putting a price on carbon in order to be able to have an effective climate policy, as well as the difficulty of doing that in the current international environment because of the impact it will have on industries such as steel and coal. And then of course there is the issue of the world's poor. As we all talk about economic stimulus packages (in the US we're looking at an \$820 billion stimulus package), can we find a way to have a \$50 billion stimulus package for the world's poor.

These are some of the questions that emerge and are drawn from the type of analysis that we do here today. Secretary Miliband I look forward to your comments today.

David Miliband:

Well thank you very much. Indeed, it's a great pleasure to be here and a privilege to have such a distinguished panel discussing all that you've laid out. Are you sure that's all you want me to cover in just 10 minutes?

I think that now most politicians are starting their speeches with quotations of Obama, and I want to do the same. Because there was an important line, of many, in his inaugural address last week, that has been highlighted in the UK media and that I think important, though it is a simple one, and it is that 'the world has changed, and we must change with it.'

Obvious, but it's important how you define the change, and I just want to say that three things define the change for me.

One is global real-time interdependence, and the economic crisis is the best example of that, but if you want to see the difficulty of people in the Bangladesh delta with rising sea levels you can see another example. I think that is a big change.

The second big change is the shift in the balance of power. I think in the 1970s people got a bit over excited about the shift from the national to the international level, but there is a shift (I'll come back later to say why I think nation-states can still be a very important part of the answer, because I think they got dismissed out of hand in the '70s). There's a second shift from west to east, but there's also a shift, and I think this is really important, from governments and corporations to individuals. I call it the civilian surge, and I believe that that shift brought about by the freedom with which information and ideas move around the world is very, very significant indeed. It really is a small planet in this sense. So these are the second set of changes.

The third set of changes, which are different now than when we met six months ago to talk about the book, is the obvious economic crisis, and in my judgment there are two very different forces pulling in opposite forces as a result of the economic crisis and nobody knows what its geopolitical consequences are going to be. One force is pulling toward more nationalist protection – choose your metaphor: drawing up the bridge, creating the fortress. That's real. People want to look after their own first. But, and maybe we feel this strongly because we're hosting the second G20 summit in London this 2nd of April, the opposite force is that it's so obvious these international crises – not just financial but economic, and with its roots in \$147 barrels of oil – there's an opposite force which is to move to a renewal of multilateralism, and my view, which is in the book really, is that you're not going to solve the problems if that first force of the economic crisis wins out.

It's not that 'we're all multilateralists now', but those of us on the panel and who worked on the book, and me from the British government, we think that unless multilateralism is renewed, we're not going to tackle these problems. And I think it's important if we're going to win the case for multilateralism we have to pose the choice quite starkly. And I think that means recognizing that globalization does bring new vulnerabilities, but I think we should pose the question as whether or not we want to deepen globalization, or seek to roll it back. Because I think that is the choice we face. Deepening means developing political institutions that are able to guide and engage in questions of equity and security and stability: that are the essential province of the multilateral system. Especially if you define it so broadly - economic and social security - as you did. I think that, now I'm not going to use these remarks to go into the details of some of the proposals that you've made (which I think are interesting and good), this is an important book, and I know that the timing was clearly intended to communicate with the new US president, though before you would have known who it would be. Now I think this is an important moment here, and there is a great deal of global engagement on these issues, and I do want to come back to this at the end.

What I want to say for the middle part of my remarks is that with the word insecurity in your title, *Managing Global Insecurity*, I think it very important to be precise. If you think about most of the multilateral institutions, above all the UN, it was created to stop one state abusing the rights of another state, and that remains an important function of a multilateral system. And there are some very major challenges, if you want to look to the next presidential term, in this period, to develop ways to ensure that states that have strength and are able to deploy it do so within a set of what you would call 'responsible rules.'

There's a second issue which you touched on only very glancingly but it is very, very important because it's a different type of challenge and that is not of strong states but of weak states. The international system was not set up to take care of weak states. I spend a lot of my time thinking about Afghanistan and Pakistan, and I think that in the issues of governance that are raised, there is something I want to say a word about. There is not an absence of multilateral engagement in Afghanistan. Well, someone said too much, but I think the issue of whether these multilateral institutions could coordinate better – align better – is a very profound issue. It's not just the UN, it's not just NATO, it's not just the EU. We've got a wide range of institutions seeking to support good governance by the Afghan government - because no one wants to be in Afghanistan to create a new colony – rather the international

community is there to bolster a sovereign government. But I do think that this is a central theatre now where, though the international community makes demands of the Afghan government, obviously, it has got to look at itself as well. They should want to produce the right kind of support. One test of your proposals as I go through the summary, I was asking myself on the different tracks, how much difference will this make in Kabul; in Helmand. I think those are hard questions to ask because UN reform can seem a long, long way away from those places.

I think one thing that adds to the mix is the very welcome decision by Obama to focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan together. Their respective stability is mutually dependent. I think that is really an important test for the book.

After regularizing strong states and their behaviour, and supporting weak ones, the third great insecurity is the absence of a mechanism to deliver public goods. Economic stability is a global public good, nuclear non-proliferation is a global public good, and climate change (or rather its global mitigation) is a global public good. And in a way it's the easiest way to make the case for multilateralism, because no one country can meet these on its own, but it's also the hardest. If you thought the world trade deal was a tough negotiation, climate change is much more complex. And there are many difficult aspects to it. I actually think the fundamental issue is not a policy question but is a political one, and is about fairness and equity in the global system.

The great fear of the developing countries is that climate change is going to be used as an excuse to hold them back. The challenge of the richer world is not just for us to get our own houses in order, but also to find ways of financing adaptation and mitigation of climate change in the developing world. In this sense it is a profound political question. The cruel irony is that some of the richest countries are largely protected from the effects of climate change, while some of the poorest will be hit the most by climatic consequences. So, while Nick Stern's argument about the economics of climate change pointing towards action is true, the issue is most stark in the developing world - who have the least capacity to deal with it.

A deal will be made or not made around the issue of the global financing of mitigation.

One quick word about the role of regional powers, because its not a strong feature of your report for reasons I can understand, but nonetheless I think it's a little disappointing that we – or put it this way (since I'm here to praise not to bury) – I think we've got to do more work on the role of regional bodies. Think

about the situation in Africa at the moment. You've got the world's biggest peace-keeping operation in the world in the DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo) at about a billion dollars a year; you've got a massive set of commitments on paper to Sudan from the UN; and you've got the AU (African Union) in Somalia and the prospect of a decision by the UN in six to nine month time on whether or not to deploy a PKO (Peace-Keeping Operation) into Somalia. All this, bearing in mind, a very important issue for us, is Zimbabwe, which is both a strong state in its ability to abuse its citizens, and a weak one in terms of supporting them. And it's an exporter of instability to its neighbours, as there are three to four million refugees in South Africa.

Now there will never be African solutions to African problems unless there is a strong regional role for some organization like the African union and I think that as we think about the role the EU has played. I believe it was your former boss who once said 'it is not the example of our power but the power of our example'. In the EU the power of example has been very, very profound. Because the EU of now is a very different beast to that which it was 10 or 15 years ago: a union of 27, a motivator of reform, a threshold on human rights, and a discipline on governments in Eastern Europe. I think a major question is whether this model can be used elsewhere.

Let me just finish on the following two notes. One, we're actually talking about order and responsibility on the one hand, and freedom on the other, and they can seem like opposites. But if you have freedom without order you have anarchy, and if you have order without freedom you have authoritarianism. And as I looked at the executive summary of the book I felt that was a real thread running through.

There's another final thread running through that I just want to mention and that is there's a transatlantic thread. Because I think that a lot of European foreign ministers feel that there's certainly a big chance but maybe the last chance to frame a global settlement on the basis of transatlantic values now. It's not just a transatlantic relationship because if we're going to address our problems we've got to think more globally. But I do hope our American guests who've come here today will take back a very strong message (and you'll go to Paris and Brussels I think next week), the very strong feeling in Europe that we want to work with the new administration on the kind of ideas that are in your book and founded on the idea of responsible sovereignty.

The nation-states are still the locus of political activity, but they also need to know they're own limits, and know when to work together.

I think this is an exciting time, actually, to be trying to address these issues.

Thank you very much indeed.

Carlos Pascual:

You addressed many of the issues we tried to address in the book extraordinarily well, and you've rightly put your finger on the role of regional organizations. It is something we tried to address in different parts of the book.

Sandy, if I could start with you, is there anything you want to say with regard to Secretary Miliband's remarks? And earlier in the discussion, you talked about regional organizations in relation to the Middle East, I don't know if you have anything to add to that...

Sandy Berger:

I just want to contribute briefly to the discussion. I think the Secretary's comments were interesting and important, but I do want to say a word about institution building.

The international financial crisis presents not only a challenge but it presents an opportunity to create machinery and new institutions that come out of that process. Now the G20 in London will focus on a substantial and important substantive agenda which is important for the economic viability of the whole planet but I hope that coming out of London there will be some forward agenda for institution building and I just want to highlight for one second the idea in this book that there be a constitution for a G16 or G20 (the number will emerge from various meetings that take place in various capitals over the next year or two and we can argue about numbers then). Because it seems to me there is some value of institutionalizing this central command, this central steering committee, and evolving it over time. And the book points out several advantages of that: as a negotiation forum, where consensus can be achieved for a broader grouping; developing trust among the members of this G+; encouraging responsibility by them for what takes place in their own country and their role in the world; and achieving some kind of shared threat assessment, that they can carry into the Security Council to make the Security Council more effective.

So, I just want to put that on the table for this discussion: to include not only all the issues raised but the institution-building opportunity that emerges from the global financial crisis to create something that has some kind of durability.

Carlos Pascual:

Excellent. And indeed, raising that point now, at times it is the sort of issue that people say can put others [issues] to sleep, but in fact if you don't make that investment in these institutions you don't have the capacity to do the kind of things that Secretary Miliband was talking about. How we deal more effectively with the AU? How we deal more effectively in Pakistan and Afghanistan? Tom, do you want to pick up from there?

Thomas Pickering:

I do. I want to thank you Foreign Secretary for raising what I think are a whole series of fundamental issues in very brief but very sharp contrast here today. And, how in fact they are going to be pervasive certainly in the next 10 or 20 years of this century and we will have to contest with those. I think that institution building is a very important part of the report and Sandy has just discussed what I think is a very significant aspect that I'd like to take just a little bit further.

I think that variable geometry may turn out to be something that is useful to us: that a Group of 20, a Group of 16, a Group of two, and a Group of eight will all have roles to play. I think, as well, that while we look at these institutions it is not just the 'G' groupings. There are two other sets of aspects that are very, very important.

One is what I would call finding opportunities to create new institutions to solve or work on new problems. And I would put a great deal of emphasis on the fact that we should not be consumed with architecture and that we should allow form to follow function. We should put our institutional emphases where they can produce the best results in substantive terms. Here, I can think of at least two major problems we have: new issues - climate change; new issues - a potentially international nuclear fuel-bank; as having two kinds of institutional arrangements which are very different that can help us move ahead. Both of them have the opportunity to begin to reflect on what I think we would, over time, like to do for repairing old institutions. That is, find ways to bring new leading states into the institutional arrangements where they should have been, but for the stasis and indeed because of the formulations that are related in these institutions, they can't get there yet.

So, it may well be that the principle emitters in climate change are also the principle payers in the long-term that we want to see on the Security Council. And we should find ways to move that process along. I'm convinced that

diplomacy is evolutionary and that revolutions in diplomacy come often but never have the persistence that we can give it in the evolutionary chain.

I just want to say two other things. The book puts a heavy emphasis on bringing into the UN Security Council greater time for some of the major players. That is very worthwhile looking at. It also contains ideas that it is perhaps time for the permanent members to perhaps ease up on the veto. The veto is a very controversial subject but one of the things that is suggested is that if two or perhaps three can agree that a process should not go ahead, then in fact that might represent a different way of casting a veto than if just one state should stand out among the permanent members. This grew out of discussions originally about genocide and there, I think Foreign Secretary and audience, you see, why one state should not possess some total veto power to prevent the Council acting to stop the perpetration of genocide. These are difficult questions. No permanent member likes even to talk about the veto, much less contemplate changes in it. But it is one of those factors that will be very important as we revive this organization and bring credibility to the bodies. Let me leave it there, there's enough controversy to go around, and perhaps let Carlos pick up and see where he'd like to go next.

Carlos Pascual:

Good. Let me just ask my two co-authors if there are any points they'd like to inject at this point in the discussion. Steve?

Stephen J Stedman:

Sure, yeah, just to pick up on something that Tom said. When we started to write the book and start the work we decided on an issue-by-issue approach, and we weren't beholden to any structure, or grand architecture. We wanted to see what worked in dealing with non-proliferation and disarmament; what would work in terms of climate change; what would work in terms of better peace-keeping arrangements; what would work in terms of economic stability. The fact of the matter is that the same cast of characters kept showing up and they weren't just the G8. It goes to Sandy's point that if you can find a way in a formulation whether it be a G13, G16 or G20, that can give you leverage across a whole host of transnational issues then the sooner you build it the sooner you will be effective.

And just to go to the Foreign Secretary's point about crisis, its not just that the pay-off will be you might get progress on climate change, or on the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] Treaty next year, but you might just get progress on your

crises as well, when you were asking 'what does this mean for Afghanistan?' Well, one thing I can tell you is that it's fine for the US to have a strategy that incorporates Afghanistan and Pakistan as one problem - and that's terrific, it's a start - but if you do that that, you better know how you're going to leverage China, India, Saudi Arabia, Iran as well as Afghanistan and maybe Russia at the margins. And lo and behold we're back at, or close to, the same old cast of characters. If you think in terms of a G20 or G16 and if you build confidence and trust amongst them and you can pre-negotiate on a host of issues and create relationships and networks across ministries, then you might just get more efficacy on your efforts on crises as well.

Carlos Pascual:

Bruce, did you want to say anything picking up on that point. I know in particular you've done a lot of work on conflict, especially helping the UK on some of the ways they've been thinking about building up their capacity to do that. Do you want to pitch in on that?

Bruce Jones:

Yeah, just briefly, on the point about regional organization and Afghanistan. Let's look backwards on Afghanistan briefly. We would be in a significantly stronger shape here if over the past eight or more years we had invested serious effort in building up the capacity of the UN and NATO to do the state-building work of governments, and we've been frankly frittering at the edges of this agenda for several years and so the capacities are much weaker than they need to be. That does create a dilemma where we are. Your point that these ideas need to be tested in hard cases is a real one and to the political audiences of these ideas, they'll be tested in the hard cases of Afghanistan, Iran and other places and the unfortunate reality is that the tools we have to deal with these crises are weaker than they should be to deal with the toughest cases.

I think our perspective should be that we don't let these crises and the weakness of institutions in their response to the crises deflect us away from the necessary investment in those institutions for their capability to address such issues in the longer-term.

Precisely in that spirit I want to pick up on the suite of actors you're going to have to deal with. In the broader Middle East, incorporating Afghanistan, it seems that in parallel with the specific crisis-management work going on in Gaza, Iraq, Iran and so on, there would be merits in beginning a process

slowly, in parallel on a second track, to begin talking to that broader suite of actors about regional security structures that could come on stream further down the road, but that would give that broader suite of actors a sense of participation in the future of the region both in security terms and in economic terms. This might hopefully create some incentives along the way for them to be more cooperative in the management of longer-term crises today. And so you have to articulate where you're going in order to get equity you can deal with on the shorter-term crisis to try to handle this period when the tools aren't strong enough.

Carlos Pascual:

Secretary Miliband, do you want to reflect on anything?

David Miliband:

Well just a couple of points. I think the central place your report gives the wider Middle East is very well founded, and from skimming through, well argued. One of you can tell me if it's true that President Eisenhower used to say 'if there's a problem you can't solve, enlarge it.' I've been thinking about that a lot in the discussion of this idea for a two-state solution in the Middle East.

If you think about it hard, there do need to be two secured states: a secured Israel and a viable Palestinian state. But actually, you need what I call a 23 state solution: the 22 states of the Arab League plus Israel. And that speaks to a more comprehensive political process and political, well, I don't want to call it bargain, but, resolution. You are enlarging the problem by bringing in extra factors but you are also bringing in extra actors to help resolve problems. Arab states can offer Israel a normalization of relations, a big offer at the heart of negotiations, and I think that's why enlargement of that Middle Eastern problem is very, very important.

On the institution building front we're in a slightly odd position in this country because our relationship with the EU has been somewhat vexed over time. The Ambassador made a really important point that it's the weakness of international institutions that creates insecurity, not their over-weening strength, that reduces freedom. Now this may seem obvious to you, but there is a live debate in this country about whether or not this is true in the case of the EU, because that is the argument of our political opponents – not whether the EU needs to develop new capacities, but whether or not it is too strong.

In an interdependent world you need strong international institutions, not weak ones, in my view, and you need to build them up. We have this quite incredible situation where the Royal Navy is commanding an ESDP deployment in the Gulf of Aden to tackle piracy. In one person's world that is 'mission creep' of the European Union but in my world, that is just common sense in recognizing Europe's interest in global trade and the rule of the sea and deploying the use of forces on a basis in which every country has a veto so it is really inter-governmental. I think that that is really institution building.

Carlos Pascual:

Tom? Please, go ahead...

Thomas Pickering:

Just, Foreign Secretary, if I could pick up on your very wise idea of a 23 state solution. I see an interconnectedness between the Mediterranean and the Hindu Kush that is real and probably we're talking about 27 states and we can take it further.

Iran is right in the middle. Iraq is not going to be resolved without an Iranian role. I don't believe Afghanistan is going to be resolved without some Iranian role. Afghanistan and Pakistan we've already admitted are directly inter-linked and then you have Turkey, hovering on the edge, which plays a very significant role I think in terms of the Arab-Israeli dispute – as we have seen with their negotiation role with Syria, water treatment in the region, what happens in Iraq, and especially over how the Kurds are going to be treated.

David Miliband:

And they're also trying to come in to the European Union.

Thomas Pickering:

Absolutely, and let me express my view that they should...as irrelevant as that may be.

David Miliband:

And mine too.

Dr Robin Niblett:

Can we enlarge then, and get a couple of questions from our guests and audience here today. We did have a session earlier today, and there are a few questions I wasn't able to get in then so I will call on those three people, baring in mind we must close at 12 on the dot. If we have time for more then we'll do more but let me get those three in...

Mina Al-Oraibi:

Yes, Mina Al-Oraibi, member of Chatham House. Please could you talk about Russia and its role in the Middle East, and the implications of this for the US. It seems the ties Russia has fostered are strongest with the so-called radical regimes as opposed to the allies of the US, the moderate regimes. What does this mean for peace in the region? And what does it mean in terms of energy, not least given Putin's idea of a 'gas OPEC' and its political implications?

Dr Robin Niblett:

That last point was an interesting one and we should note we're not excited about all the new institutions we may soon be seeing emerge. Dr Cornish, you next?

Paul Cornish:

Thank you very much Robin. I'm Paul Cornish. I run the International Security Programme here at Chatham House. I'll just come to my very general question if I might, for the panel, and perhaps even for the Secretary of State, to comment upon. I really do look forward to reading this book, and like the Secretary of State I'd like to begin by reflecting on President Obama's inaugural speech. I noticed he congratulated President Bush on his role in a seamless and even very comfortable transition. Now my question is whether that really is the only thing the US has got right over the last eight years?

On my list I've got things like African development aid; counter-insurgency doctrine and practice in Afghanistan; the G8 global partnership against the spread of weapons of mass destruction, things I know you're all familiar with.

Now, I am very much excited about the new body language coming out of the new US administration, but I do wonder if a complete re-boot of US foreign policy is really necessary or wise? I noticed in the papers this morning that already the clearing up of Guantanamo might be a little trickier than it at first seemed, and this is just one week in.

Dr Robin Niblett:

Thank you very much, one more question or comment.

Xenia Dormandy:

Xenia Dormandy, Harvard University. I'd like to pick up a point Secretary Miliband made and take it further. *Vis-à-vis* climate change and *vis-à-vis* Afghanistan, there's little question, certainly in this room about the benefit and need of actually an institution to help resolve these problems. But one of the biggest problems is how do you share the burden. How do you judge fairness, and who is responsible for what?

That seems to me the biggest problem of what we're addressing, and not the argument of needing to come together and who need be at the table. The problem is rather choosing who does what at the table, and how do you make it equitable?

Dr Robin Niblett:

So three pretty big questions and I think we'll let any of you reply as you will. So, Russia and gas in the Middle East; the need or not to re-boot US foreign policy; and finally, burden sharing. Carlos, do you want to start?

Carlos Pascual:

Actually I'm going to ask Sandy, if it's okay, if he'd like to start. Well I told you he was my boss.

Sandy Berger:

You never listened to me when you worked with me.

Carlos Pascual:

Its okay, it's harder for you to tell me what to do when we're here like this.

Sandy Berger:

It strikes me listening to this really very interesting conversation, both the first hour and this, that with respect to Obama and expectations, there really is a double-edged sword here. On the one hand, the expectations are high, and one wonders how long of a honeymoon he will have. In the United States I said earlier, according to the polls at least, the American people are quite

tolerant. They're excited about Obama, but they realize the problems are enormous, and the polling suggests they will give Obama about two years to turn the economy around. Now, I'm rather sceptical that they will give him two years. Somewhere in the first year it will become his economy and he will have to deal with the consequences of that and his popularity will descend.

But as I listen here I think there is a second danger and that is that with high aspirations, if we are too ebullient, we may seem arrogant. And I think we must take care to avoid the danger, when he presents himself to the world, that he not do so in the manner of the second coming. Obviously it's a second coming for America in many respects but obviously there is a great deal of continuity. There are things the Bush administration did well. Our India policy was very strong. Bush is more popular in India than he is in the United States. We did a civil nuclear agreement with India which was a fundamental shift in America's posture towards India. The PETFAR Program was strongly funded by the Bush administration-

Carlos Pascual:

- it's on HIV/AIDS for those that don't know.

Sandy Berger:

I'm sorry. That's right.

So there are things the Obama administration needs to pick up on. But obviously in the beginning there is an enormous premium on stressing that things have changed. I think we all have to accept when we hear that that there is a certain amount of politics going on but there is obviously a new day for the US.

Dr Robin Niblett:

Foreign Secretary, do you have anything to add?

David Miliband:

Just a couple of points to pick up off Sandy. Expectations are the fuel of hope in politics and I was very struck by then president-elect Obama's speech in Chicago on the night of the election, and I think that everyone was struck by the inaugural address – it wasn't party-time. It was serious-work-time. I think that message has seriously reached Europe and I think it has gone more widely actually.

But I don't think high hopes means utopian dreams. I think actually people are very engaged by the sort of politics he represents but they've taken his warnings about the time it will take, the difficulty of the issues and the need for strategy and preparations pretty seriously and I think that will help on the burden-sharing.

I think it's not well known that the German government has significantly increased its commitments in Afghanistan. So has the French government, so has Poland. I think, given the history, those are big and serious and brave and strategic decisions being made by those political leaders. They are taking serious decisions. And they are doing it in a way that speaks for the potential of a wider 'trans-Atlantic' alliance. India is also developing Afghanistan, Japan has projects and I think actually people will rally around a clear strategy. I think that is important.

There is not the proper time to do justice to the position of Russia, which is particularly interesting in the context of the economic crisis, and the change in the oil price but I think that we should insist we want Russia in the international system playing a leading role in it.

One of the reflections I have is that in the 1990s we were trying to create a partnership with Russia, but it seems many in Russia rather think we were trying to encircle them. And in a way, we're convinced about our own motives, but they are not. They are economically engaged and interdependent, they want to hold the next Middle East peace conference, on Iran they seem engaged, but we must make, of all this, real substance.

Dr Robin Niblett:

I'm conscious that we must finish, actually in about 20 seconds. Carlos, let me permit you to make a closing remark.

Carlos Pascual:

I think one of the things we found is that unilateralism as a policy failed. Even for the most powerful nation in the world, it failed. And I think Russia needs to realize that. The other piece of that is for us to recognize where our interests collide in the long-term.

The challenge is how do we present those interests when we have a long-term interest in a prosperous planet and a viable planet, where we have greater freedom and security for all of us, and then to use that as a way to leverage it back to how we design policy in the near-term. This is one of the

things we've tried to do in the book: to provide practical recommendations on how we might approach these issues. Thank you Robin for allowing us to come speak.

Dr Robin Niblett:

Would you please join me in thanking our speakers: Foreign Secretary, Carlos, Steve, Bruce, Sandy Berger and Thomas Pickering, thank you all.