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Time for a Two-Tier Nato?

Experts' Comment - 1 April 2008

Dr Paul Cornish, Head, International Security Programme and Carrington Chair in International Security, Chatham House

The agenda for NATO's summit meeting this week in Bucharest is sure to be long, and rather daunting. In everything from operations in Afghanistan, to arms control in Europe, to capability and equipment development, to revision of its core mission, the Alliance seems to be in a state of terminal uncertainty, if not outright crisis.

The one glimmer of light is the offer made by President Sarkozy to bring France back into NATO's Integrated Military Structure. If all goes well, Sarkozy's initiative could bring to an end years of controversy surrounding the substance and purpose of the transatlantic security partnership. On the other hand, it might not. If the recent past is anything to go by, the latest attempt at rapprochement will generate high-minded declarations of intent, a whole new raft of NATO and EU acronyms, but little of what is actually wanted in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

A new, more imaginative approach is needed. Relations between NATO and the EU, and between the United States and some of its European allies, are as unproductive as they have ever been. President Sarkozy's approach is unlikely to close these gaps, for a number of reasons. First, much of this has been seen before, in December 1995 under Chirac, and three years later at the Anglo-French summit in St Malo. The St Malo agreement was useful; it led to the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy. But not even the most ardent Europhile could claim that St Malo solved the problem of transatlantic security non-co-operation, or indeed did as much as was hoped for European security itself.

It is not yet clear what France will expect in return for its move back into NATO's military structure, but early indications suggest that Sarkozy's wish-list will be too long and too ambitious. It seems reasonable enough that France should expect an equitable share in NATO's command structure and organisation. More significantly, France will also expect a change of mood - especially in the United Kingdom - as far as the ESDP is concerned. This is where the French initiative is most likely to fail. The UK might with some justice argue that it is already doing all it can to contribute to European and international security, and that any criticism should be directed at other European capitals. The real difficulty for the UK, however, will be on a point of principle. The UK's long-standing approach to European security and defence collaboration has been that any such effort should complement and not conflict with NATO, and it seems unlikely that London will perform a volte-face in order to make Paris feel welcomed. The risk is that if Paris asks too much and London gives too little, the Euro-Atlantic security debate might revert to the institutional turf wars of the 1990s.

Time for a change of approach.

In the early 1990s, many analysts of US-European security politics reacted with alarm at the prospect of anything other than unified and coherent transatlantic security and defence co-operation. Various alternatives were nevertheless suggested. 'Bifurcation', for example, would have seen a functional division of responsibility, with NATO having the task of high-level collective defence, while a European organisation undertook less intense military missions. 'Binarism', on the other hand, would have seen the abolition of NATO's integrated command, with the United States and Europe each becoming responsible for their own territorial security.

Both ideas were condemned as heresy, with a vigour which continues to drive discussion. In February, US Defence Secretary Robert Gates warned that NATO was in danger of dividing into 'two camps' - 'those who are willing to fight and those who are not'. At the same time, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer argued vigorously against the prospect of a divided NATO.

Behind the impassioned rejection of a two-tier NATO lies the mistaken assumption that the complex needs of transatlantic security and defence can somehow be shoe-horned into a single 'Atlanticist' vision and a single institution - NATO. Something similar drives the more evangelical 'Europeanist' proponents of ESDP. The reality, however, is that US-European security and defence relations involve two institutions, each of which can provide different things, and that within both organisations some countries are better at certain aspects of security than others.

The challenge for NATO's leaders is to accept that European security is not a problem susceptible only to a NATO-shaped solution. NATO must continue to be a net contributor to European and international security, but must also recognise the need for close and constructive co-operation with the European Union. Some governments and parliaments will prefer to act within one framework, some within another, and some not at all. In an alliance of democracies it would be as well to respect these preferences. Of the twenty-six members of NATO, twenty-one are also members of the EU; a mature and constructive relationship across the Atlantic and between the two institutions really ought by now to be on the cards.

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