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Monday 13 October 2008 12:00 - 13:00Pakistan
Experts' Comment
The first article below, Pakistan's Army Will Still be the Final Arbiter, by Dr Farzana Shaikh, was published in the Independent on Sunday on 17 February 2008.
Martial, Feudal or Plural? by Dr Gareth Price was published in The House Magazine on 11 February 2008.
Further Chatham House resources on Pakistan.
Pakistan's Army Will Still be the Final Arbiter
Tomorrow's Election Will Make Little Difference
Dr Farzana Shaikh, Associate Fellow, Asia Programme, Chatham House.
This article was published in the Independent on Sunday on 17 February 2008.
No poll this year is likely to be watched with as much apprehension as tomorrow's general elections in Pakistan. Despite serious reservations about the credibility of the process, many believe that they may yet serve as the magic wand to overcome Pakistan's crisis of governance. Will they?
Pakistan has been convulsed by catastrophic events over the last four months that have transformed these elections from a carefully stage-managed show for the benefit of President Musharraf to an ominous-looking referendum on his performance, which threatens his political survival. In less than a year, the man once touted as indispensable to the country's stability now stands exposed as possibly the greatest obstacle to that end.
At the heart of this astonishing transformation lies a colossal erosion of trust between Musharraf and the Pakistani people. It was brought rudely to the surface within hours of Benazir Bhutto's assassination last December. National grief turned to bitter anger against Musharraf, who stood accused of complicity in her murder. Since then, every effort by his officials to inspire public confidence has been met with open disbelief, as was most recently demonstrated by scepticism over the Scotland Yard report on her killing.
However, this breakdown in public trust long predated Bhutto's death. Musharraf's controversial dismissal of the country's Chief Justice last March, his questionable re-election as President while still holding the post of army chief in clear violation of the constitution, and his ill-advised decision to impose emergency rule, lost him the support he once enjoyed among the liberal-minded classes, who had looked to him to protect the country's institutions. But it was his assault on the Red Mosque in July last year that represented a turning point in Musharraf's political fortunes. It constituted the ultimate breach of a contract between him and his allies on the religious right, who viewed him and his military-dominated regime as the ultimate guarantors of their interests in the face of mounting pressure to tackle Islamic extremism.
The damage caused by this loss of public confidence could have been partially contained had Musharraf chosen to heal divisions by working towards genuinely free and fair elections. That would have involved a neutral caretaker government, an impartial Election Commission and a district administration free of bias. In their absence, many now fear that the climate of mistrust will translate into a climate of generalised violence after the polls. This would incite Islamic militant groups to renew their campaign and could draw Musharraf into a deadly power struggle with opposition forces determined to oust him.
The Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan Muslim League, led by former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, have both warned of mass unrest if the election results fail to meet their expectations. What these expectations are is difficult to judge in the context of Pakistan's distorted electoral market. But it is fair to assume that anything less than a parliamentary majority reducing Musharraf to a political irrelevance will be unacceptable to the opposition. At the same time, it is fair to assume the commando in Musharraf is unlikely to go down without a fight.
The deciding factor, as always in Pakistan, will be the army. Its new chief, General Kiyani, has made clear that the interests of his institution are now distinct from Musharraf's own political ambitions. Much will hinge on whether or not Kiyani is willing to put that to the test by distancing himself from Musharraf. If so, he will be continuing a long and fundamentally undisturbed tradition that sets the army, rather than the electorate, as the ultimate kingmaker in Pakistan.
Martial, Feudal or Plural?
Dr Gareth Price, Head, Asia Programme, Chatham House
This article was published in The House Magazine, 11 February 2008.
The forthcoming election in Pakistan will be over-shadowed by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto late last year, presumably by Islamist extremists. The best hope - if not exactly expectation - prior to her death was that Ms Bhutto and the president, General Pervez Musharraf, had learnt many lessons from the previous twenty years and would work together against the radical forces that threaten stability in Pakistan.
Musharraf had recently removed his military uniform, a long-standing demand of many liberal forces within and without Pakistan. While the new army chief was seen as a protégé of Musharraf, the move was seen as a positive step.
But this also took place in the context of a crackdown on both the press, and lawyers. Justified on the grounds that the war against militancy needed to be expedited, there was a widespread belief that the Supreme Court would have ruled that Musharraf's re-election as president was unconstitutional. A number of senior judges, including the former chief justice, were removed and the revamped court ruled against challenges to Musharraf's re-election.
Further concern about Pakistan's future direction came from the decision to push back the date of the election to February 18th. Ms Bhutto's party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), has claimed that the election delay was an attempt to boost the interests of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League (Q), which may have feared a sympathy vote in favour of the PPP.
While the PPP and another opposition party, Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League (N), have claimed that the ruling party has tried to pre-determine the result of the poll, there is only so much that the government can do to ensure its survival. Were the PML (Q) to win, claims of vote-rigging would hover within Pakistan, and within the capitals of Musharraf's US and European allies. This may well mean that the election is one of the fairest Pakistan has seen of late, though with the proviso that opposition groups are unlikely to win the two-thirds majority they would require to indict Musharraf.
A fractured outcome appears the most likely result, with the three main parties each performing well, but with no-one able to win a majority. The wheeler-dealing that would result in such an event may well be something to behold. After the 2002 election around 20 PPP parliamentarians switched to the ruling party to take ministerial berths. Expect more of the same in 2008.
Nawaz Sharif has publicly called the elections a farce and has said that the PML (N) is running in protest. Sharif has been barred from standing for election (and it would require a constitutional amendment for him to become prime minister). But while the party is likely to contest the election outcome, if it does well, Nawaz, or more likely his brother Shahbaz, the former chief minister of Punjab, stand a decent chance of becoming prime minister.
The immediate problem for Pakistan is how any of the personalities involved manage to work together following an election. Nawaz may well prefer to stay in opposition, counting on post-election chaos to reduce Musharraf's public standing and forcing either to stand down or to call another election. Musharraf ousted him in a coup in 1999 and despite western hopes that the two will put aside their differences, there's no sign of that happening soon.
The sympathy vote from which the PPP is likely to benefit may be tempered by the dynastic succession triggered by Benazir Bhutto's will. Her husband, Asif Ali Zadari, is held in lower public esteem than she was, and more tarnished by corruption allegations. He spent many years in prison on charges he claims were politically motivated. But, unlike Nawaz Sharif, his path to becoming prime minister is not constitutionally barred, and he has appeared increasingly confident of his chances.
Thus, in the short-term Pakistan's future will be determined by personal interactions between a small group of rich industrialists, feudal landlords and the military. In the longer-term, the question will be what policies they adopt to try to ameliorate Pakistan's numerous fault-lines, not least of which is the division between the small, English-speaking elite and the rest. Almost since it gained independence, and more prominently since the 1970s, Islam has been used as a means of forging a Pakistani identity above localised ethnic divisions. This has served political purposes from the late-1970s providing a pool from which young men could be drawn to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and then in Indian-administered Kashmir.
Pakistan's ambivalence to Islamist forces started to wane following 9/11 and the gradual rapprochement with India, and certainly ended when Musharraf, under US and Chinese pressure, ordered troops to storm the Red Mosque in Islamabad. While the election is being played out, the fall-out from this decision is being felt throughout Pakistan. Suicide bombings are becoming commonplace (having averaged just four a year between 2002 and 2006). The situation in the tribal areas of Pakistan is deteriorating fast: the military's prestige has been tarnished since militants captured 300 or so soldiers last year.
Whether those in power can effectively counter radical Islamists will determine Pakistan's future over the year's to come. The threat that these groups will take over Pakistan's nuclear facilities is over-stated, but the fear that the country gradually shifts towards an Islamist agenda or that the military itself becomes more radicalised is real in the longer-term.
Does anyone in Pakistan's current political class have the answers to the extraordinarily difficult questions the country faces? Possibly, but the politicians need to end the short-term self-interest that dominated civilian rule in the 1990s. Part of the problem is that the economic interests of the political class are highly similar: don't expect any to vote to effectively end the feudal system, for instance. Problems will arise if Islamist groups present themselves as the only plausible alternative to this self-perpetuating elite.
Musharraf's record on some issues has been positive. Whether or not he has made the best use of the inflows of funds into Pakistan since 9/11 is moot. The answer will become clear should his Western backers turn against him. But on issues such as press freedom, he has overseen a proliferation of TV stations, much of them filled with critical coverage. And, although progress is slow, the ending of constant hostility with India is to his credit.
It is difficult to paint a rosy picture of Pakistan's future. The military has lost its standing as Pakistan's most effective institution owing to military set-backs in the tribal areas and its growing involvement in the economy. The new army chief has signalled that he wants the army to concentrate on its primary function, and step back from politics. This would be a good start. But if Sharif or Zadari take power, would the military soon intervene if they disprove of their method of governing? If so, civilian rulers will become yet more short-term in outlook. And the more the military intervenes, the less hope there is that Pakistan can build effective institutions necessary to tackle its challenges. For the West, supporting institutions, rather than individuals, should be the priority.
Please find a list of further resources below.
Briefing Paper
Pakistan's foreign policy under Musharraf: between a rock and a hard place
Owen Bennett Jones and Farzana Shaikh, March 2006
The World Today
Pakistan and the Rule of Law: Judged and Found Wanting
Irene Khan, Feb 2008
Pakistan: Real and Imaginary Risks
Anatol Lieven, Feb 2008
Pakistan: Anyone for a Deal?
Gareth Price, Jan 2008
Pakistan: Luck Running Out?
Farzana Shaikh, Dec 2007
Pakistan: The Judge, the Media and the General
Ayesha Khan, June 2007
Pakistan: Between Military and Militants
Ayesha Siddiqa, April 2007
Pakistan: With Me or Without Me (page 10)
Gareth Price, July 2006
Recent Media Coverage
Associated Press, Saturday 9 February
Bhutto Party Rejects UK Police Findings
A British police report stating that Benazir Bhutto was killed by a bomb rather than gunfire, is likely to stoke further controversy due to the complex political context in which the investigation took place, says Farzana Shaikh.
The Guardian, Friday 28 December
What now for Pakistan?
Farzana Shaikh says that the political destinies of President Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto were seen increasingly as interlocked and the question now is whether, with one of them permanently removed, can the other survive - can Musharraf continue at the helm?
The Scotsman, Friday 28 December
Bhutto shot in neck before her killer blew himself up
Farzana Shaikh says that Pakistan is entering uncharted waters, which could lead to further instability in a region that has seen three wars fought between Pakistan and its nuclear-armed neighbour, India.
Reuters, Thursday 27 December
Bhutto assassination plunges Pakistan into turmoil
Farzana Shaikh says that there is a very real possibility that Musharraf will decide that the situation has got out of control and that he needs to impose emergency rule again, and that this is the worst convergence of crises we have seen since Pakistan's inception in 1947.
Bloomberg, Thursday 27 December
Pakistan's Bhutto assassinated in attack at rally
Farzana Shaikh says that Benazir Bhutto posed the main threat to pro-Musharraf parties and that her assassination raises very very serious threats about the stability of Pakistan in the long-term.
The Globe and Mail, Thursday 29 November 2007
Pakistan's top general faces daunting task
Farzana Shaikh says that many in Pakistan believe that the army needs to be rescued from the personal ambitions of former general Musharraf and it will be a major challenge to restore the morale of the rank and file.
AFP, Wednesday 28 November 2007
Pakistan's Musharraf steps down as army chief
Farsana Shaikh says that President Pervez Musharraf will now be far more vulnerable than he has been to this point, and risks facing an unruly parliament which may well decide to take revenge for his past actions. Also see article by the Citizen (South Africa).
Macleans (Canada), Thursday 22 November 2007
Pakistan's last great hope
Farzana Shaikh says that Benazir Bhutto still represents the only politician with the kind of street clout to pose a challenge to President Pervez Musharraf, and poses a threat to him even under flawed conditions.
International Herald Tribune, Wednesday 21 November 2007
Commonwealth faces test of its relevance in showdown over Pakistan emergency
Farzana Shaikh says that President Pervez Musharraf would regard suspension from the Commonwealth of Nations as a huge embarrassment, as Pakistan places value on its historical links.
The Independent, Friday 16 November 2007
Have your say: Imran Kahn: is he vital to Pakistan?
Gareth Price answers a range of questions on Pakistan, with subjects including Imran Khan, Benazir Bhutto and nuclear weapons.
The Los Angeles Times, Wednesday 14 November 2007
Bhutto rules out deal with Musharraf
Gareth Price says that it is important not to rule out the possibility of a resumption of talks between Bhutto and Musharraf, pointing out that former enemies have united of late in an attempt to secure positions of power within the country.
The Guardian, Monday 5 November 2007
Musharraf snubbed Brown and Rice on emergency rule
Farzana Shaikh says a postponement of elections in Pakistan could force the US to cut military aid, damaging Gen Musharraf's standing in the army and meaning Washington may try to find a more amenable partner in the military leadership.
Bloomberg, Saturday 3 November 2007
Musharraf Suspends Constitution, Sacks Chief Justice
Farzana Shaikh says the suspension of the constitution in Pakistan is "primarily a pre-emptive move on President Musharraf's part to curb any attempts by the Supreme Court to deny him his presidential victory'', and that it is a "panic measure that could signal the beginning of the end for General Musharraf.''
Meeting Transcripts and Summaries
How Pakistan Works
Professor Anatol Lieven, Chair of International Relations and Terrorism Studies, King's College London, 5 December 2007
Pakistan - Internal And External Challenges
He Dr Maleeha Lodhi, High Commissioner For The Islamic Republic Of Pakistan, 25 March 2004
Unravelling Pakistan: Threats to Stability
Session 3: A marriage of Convenience: US-Pakistan Relations, 17 November 2005
Unravelling Pakistan: Threats to Stability
Session 2: Triggers for Collapse - insurgency and separatism, 15 June 2005
Unravelling Pakistan: Threats to Stability
Session 1: Institutional Decline - the polarisation of divisions, 17 March 2005
Chatham House Asia Programme
Find out more about the Asia Programme at Chatham House.
Library Bibliography
Iran and Pakistan: Regional Security and Beyond, Dec 07
Audio (mp3)
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