http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/rss/14 This feed contains all new content on the Chatham House website related to Middle East. http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/events/view/-/id/1485/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/events/view/-/id/1485/ 17:30, 22nd March 2010 - Jerusalem faces many challenges of both domestic and international proportions. Mayor Nir Barkat, a former high-tech entrepreneur and international businessman will present his modern vision for the city focusing on lasting economic development and opening up Jerusalem for the world. This meeting is for members only. On the occasion, guests are not permitted. E-tickets for this meeting will be sent by 18.00 on Thursday 18 March and must be presented on arrival. For more information, please contact Members Events. Thu, 11 Mar 2010 15:45:26 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/events/view/-/id/1479/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/events/view/-/id/1479/ 00:00, 8th March 2010 - This event is part of the Middle East and North Africa Programme's Egypt Event Series. In Cairo, a roundtable workshop will examine 'Infrastructure and Climate Change' and 'Sustainable Cities - Building for the Future'. This will be held under the Chatham House Rule. A panel discussion will follow at the Arab Academy in Alexandria, which will address the issue of adapting cities for climate change and the importance of maintaining a city's heritage. Attendance at this event is by invitation only. For more information please contact the Middle East and North Africa Programme. More information on the Egypt Event Series >> Thu, 04 Mar 2010 17:36:00 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/840/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/840/ This is a summary of a meeting held at Chatham House on 18 February 2010. Thu, 04 Mar 2010 17:19:05 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/events/view/-/id/1477/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/events/view/-/id/1477/ 09:30, 24th March 2010 - 2010 is set to be a significant year for Iraq. The implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement will mean the return of full sovereignty to the Iraqi state while the parliamentary election in March will affect the course of domestic politics. The indications are that there will be significant changes in the make-up of the legislature and the executive components of the state. Other issues will also be developing, including the negotiations over the hydrocarbons law, the relationship between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region, and the structure of Iraq's security services. At this special Chatham House conference, leading international experts will present cutting edge analysis of Iraqi politics in its early 'Post-American' phase. Specialists from Iraq, the US and Europe will examine the past and future of the US relationship with Iraq as well as some of the major political issues facing the country. This event will be held on the record. This is a fee-paying conference. Participation costs £195 +VAT per person. A concessionary rate for non-profit organizations may be available on application. Numbers are limited so early booking is advised. For more information please contact the Middle East and North Africa Programme. Tue, 02 Mar 2010 17:06:42 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/news/view/-/id/952/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/news/view/-/id/952/ Iran is China's third largest supplier of crude oil and China's stance of non-intervention has meant that so far it has held back from supporting tougher sanctions on Iran's nuclear programme. However, this is likely to change, writes Kerry Brown in The World Today. China will have to take a leading role in the resolution of international issues if it wants to protect its assets and interests. The Chinese government has largely been a supporter of non-proliferation - after all, it has four nuclear powers on its borders; furthermore, conflict with Iran would disrupt China's thus far, stable, energy supply. Beijing may be better positioned to look beyond the current situation and at its long-term interests in the region. How much longer China can continue to keep its head down and be all things to all people? It is soon learning that having assets and supply sources abroad almost inevitably brings demands to take a firmer position and get involved with foreign disputes. Read article >> Full contents China, Iran and the United States: Best Friends with Beijing, Kerry Brown Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Under the Umbrella, Michael Ruhle World Oil Trade: New Oil Axis, John Mitchell Prospects for Oil Prices: Up and Down, Paul Stevens Guinea: Bought by Beijing, Daniel Balint-Kurti Zimbabwe: Turning Thirty, Richard Horsey Health Security and Animal Disease: Hooves and Humans, Heike Baumuller and David L Heymann Turkey: Moving East or West?, Fadi Hakura Greece and the Euro: Get a Sin Bin, Vanessa Rossi Iraq: No End in Sight, Sajjad Rizvi Tue, 02 Mar 2010 11:54:32 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/news/view/-/id/945/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/news/view/-/id/945/ The intermittent and fragile peace process between Israel and Palestine has become notorious for both its longevity and its lack of progress in reaching a definitive solution to the underlying conflict. In principle, both sides are seeking a two-state solution, based above all on a negotiated agreement over the borders between what would eventually be two sovereign states. One of the main stumbling blocks to reaching such an agreement is the status of Jerusalem, different and overlapping parts of which are claimed by each camp as its national capital. However, many in the region and further afield do not appreciate that the situation in Jerusalem is not static, but is becoming increasingly tense and fractured, says this new paper. Notes to editors Read Jerusalem: The Cost of Failure >> Contact pressoffice@chathamhouse.org.uk +44 (0)20 7957 5739 Thu, 25 Feb 2010 13:01:39 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/events/view/-/id/1458/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/events/view/-/id/1458/ 13:30, 8th March 2010 - THIS MEETING IS FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS NOW CLOSED The speaker will argue that the status quo has become deeply entrenched and that a two state solution is looking increasingly unrealistic. He will explore what would it take on the part of the United States, Israel, the Palestinians, the EU and the diaspora Jewish communities to alter the status quo. For more information please contact Members Events Tue, 23 Feb 2010 16:19:34 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/2006/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/2006/ This is the crisis that could never happen. European leaders gathered in Brussels in mid-February for talks on the Greek debt problem probably expected to wake up suddenly and find it was all a bad dream. This may also explain the seemingly erratic outpourings from these meetings, lurching from promises of support - club members stand shoulder-to-shoulder - to rather harsh demands for Athens to make tougher budget deficit cuts, with no sign of any money being put on the table in support. Greece may be wondering why it was there, like an unwelcome ghost at the feast. The truth was the Eurozone had no plan. The Euro currency entry rules, membership rules, and the Maastricht Treaty - the blueprint for the single currency which came into being in 1999 - were all designed with one critical purpose in mind: to guarantee that prudence governed member government's budgets and that public sector debt would never reach a level that could possibly pose a risk to the stability of a member state. There is very little else required or said about economic policy and other important balances and targets. Indeed in 2002, Romano Prodi, then President of the European Commission, famously caused a furore for calling the Maastricht rules stupid, to the annoyance of some, but the delight of others. In the tradition of a gentlemen's agreement, it was assumed that members would never cheat or make a mistake. And global crises that could damage the whole monetary union 'club' in such a way that deficit and debt targets would be smashed could never happen. No need to plan for something that was impossible. Prudent to profligate There are some clauses in the Treaty about bail outs. Absolutely, there can be none; no concept of bail outs, collective or individual. Indeed, they are deemed illegal except in circumstances of, say, natural catastrophe. Perhaps this is what has happened to Greece? Lack of tax collection and deficit spending were just natural? There are also sanctions - moderate penalties, like a swear box - if members breach the fiscal limits. But these were seldom invoked - just the occasional reprimand to Portugal and Greece - while letting the bigger players like Germany and France, which at some point have also breached the criteria, off the hook. No concept of a debt crisis, even though there were signs in both Greece and Portugal that these countries were having persistent problems getting to grips with economic adjustment, and thus public sector finances, while debt built up. The Maastricht obsession with public sector finances also showed a blissful lack of awareness of just how quickly a country with seemingly good public finances could hit a debt crisis. It is important to look at other indicators, especially the build up of debt in the banks and private sector, which can quickly become public sector debt in a crisis. Examples of this were obvious from the 1997 Asian crisis, when 'model' states rapidly became financial markets pariahs. So the sudden transformation of Ireland and Spain from prudent to profligate must have been quite a shock to naïve Europeans; never thought that would happen, did you? No plan B So Plan A is clear, isn't it? The Euro club did not need umbrellas because it never rained in Europe, right? But what if a crisis does occur because: A member state cheats: there is no Plan B A member state finds itself suddenly financially embarrassed, even if its previous record on debt is healthy: there is no Plan B A global crisis and recession cause unexpected and severe storm damage to deficits and debt all over the Euro area: there is no Plan B? In fact, it looks as if all these impossible events have been happening in the Euro area, so what should the club do about it? Clearly there was no Plan B before the crisis started, but no Plan B was created when the banking crisis first broke in August 2007. No Plan B was devised in 2008-2009, and there is still no Plan B today. Or if there is, then it is remarkably discrete. There have been talks and statements of solidarity from club members - shoulder to shoulder and all that - so presumably, that is settled. This is like not insuring your home because you decide that a fire can never happen, simply because your family agrees it is impossible. Try this out with your insurance company and see what its view is. The Euro club certainly needed an insurance policy, but it does not have one. Members have been warned about this from time to time, but they either found it inappropriate, or never got around to it; all very complicated no doubt and why bother as the probability of a nasty event was so low? Find the money This cannot continue. Firstly the immediate crisis must be resolved; no time now for lengthy discussion of grandiose plans. It is essential to agree where the money will come from, and quickly, to avoid the risk of a debt default in a member state. This is far better than disorderly refinancing or chaotic bail outs post default. Without putting members' own money on the table, there could be talks with leading banks to assess the feasibility of some kind of guaranteed loans to provide early refinancing of this year's upcoming Greek debt. This would buy Greece and the Euro time for further work on the fundamentals and statistics and also test an option for any other countries that might need assistance. If private finance proves impossible, then there has to be an International Monetary Fund (IMF) deal, quickly too. The refinancing problem simply cannot be ignored or postponed. But emerging from crisis management, the Euro club also needs a better process for dealing with this situation; certainly it can no longer pretend debt crises do not happen to member states. What might Plan B look like? Firstly there has to be much tougher monitoring and what is fashionably being called macro prudential oversight; perhaps drawing on a pool of independent experts to appoint the equivalent of non-executives in each country, with a wide mission to advise, observe and report back Then there has to be an agreed plan to obtain funding in an emergency. There could be two stages, for example, the first to convene a bankers' club to discuss market based solutions and, if the first fails, a second stage process for calling in the IMF Members would be obliged to take-up the financial plan proposed before any risk of a default or funding shortfall could arise Member states caught cheating in any way would be reprimanded and the responsible ministers would go into the equivalent of rugby football's 'sin bin', with the club having the right to appoint external experts to supervise offenders Accepting the possibility of a large-scale debt crisis amongst member states, even if it has low probability, means that some form of insurance option should be explored for future protection. But this will take time to arrange and may even prove impossible, for example a contingency fund is simply not affordable today. So there must also be a mechanism for moving swiftly to bargaining for a collective solution with bankers and the IMF. If these plans had already been in place, and competently executed, then perhaps much of the current furore and uncertainty could have been avoided. Orderly works out better than disorderly for all concerned. Some may still argue that the global recession was a once in a century event, and it may never happen again, but it would be foolish to ignore the risks now they are so transparent. And international credibility is on the line; there has to be a plan B. Vanessa Rossi, Senior Research Fellow, International Economics, Chatham House Tue, 23 Feb 2010 15:02:29 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/2005/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/2005/ Turkey was once a forgotten country: on the periphery of Europe, fixated with joining the European Union, a reliable NATO ally during the Cold War, and unfriendly to Iran and the Arab countries. No longer. Warmer relations with the Middle East and cooler ones with the west are now the norm, not the exception. Unsurprisingly the country's foreign policy is at the centre of debates raging on the future trajectory of this geo-strategic nation. So, in which direction is it heading? Conventional wisdom increasingly sees Turkey as drifting towards the Iran-Syria axis at the expense of Israel, Europe and the United States. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has, after all, engaged - to quote the Israeli Foreign Ministry - in a continuous verbal 'tongue-lashing' against Israel since last year's Gaza conflict, questioned western motives towards Iran, embraced Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir and deployed rhetorical assaults against French President Nicolas Sarkozy for opposing Turkey's accession to the European Union (EU). Turkey, in other words, is reflecting the ballad by Rudyard Kipling, 'Oh East is Eastand West is West, and never the twain shall meet!' And the situation is about to get even more disconcerting: the Turkey-Armenia reconciliation process, which last year seemed to promise a new beginning to resolve a century of animosity, is now on tenterhooks; the Cyprus peace negotiations, where there is a window of opportunity before the possible election in April of a hard-line president in northern Cyprus, are faltering; EU accession is on life-support; and tensions with Israel are growing. In addition, disagreements between Ankara and Washington are widening on Iran's nuclear plans, the Middle East peace process, and the possibility of recognising the events of 1915 as an Armenian genocide. Domestically, more discomforting events are on the horizon, from the near-standstill of the government's 'Kurdish initiative,' a democratic package to settle the long-standing Kurdish issue, to the deteriorating political atmosphere. Is Turkey condemned to a breakdown with the west? Although on the surface, it looks like the country is abandoning western leanings; the reality is far more complicated. Following the end of the Cold War twenty years ago, some sort of re-alignment was inevitable. Turkey was bound to re-integrate economically and politically into the Middle East and Eurasia, including with neighbouring Iran and Syria. This is most visible in the altering foreign trade picture. In 2008 Turkey's trade with the EU dropped below fifty percent for the first time, while that same year Middle Eastern countries accounted for 8.7 percent of its imports and 19.3 percent of its exports - both record figures. Another critical driver of the foreign policy re-orientation is Turkey's acute energy dependency. It is reliant on Russia and Iran for 63 percent and twenty percent respectively of its gas consumption; this impacts directly on foreign policymaking. Islamic nationalism or secular citizenship Much of the discussion on foreign policy is taking place in a vacuum, disconnected from the internal environment. This is a crucial mistake, as history and the domestic situation lie at the heart of the emerging foreign policy. Specifically, the assumption is that the ruling Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP), supported by public opinion, is pursuing an ideological anti-western foreign policy contrary to the country's traditional secular, pro-western outlook. That assumption belies a proper structural assessment of which way Turkey is actually proceeding. Starting from basics, Turkey is not a predominantly secular state. Republican Turkey was founded on two conflicting ideologies: Turkish Sunni Islamic nationalism and secular citizenship. Its constitution declares that Islam is not a source of law and public policy yet the state subsidises eighty thousand Sunni mosques, pays the salaries of ninety thousand imams and Islamic officials, and mandates religion classes focussed on Sunni Islam in schools. These two conflicting components of state tradition condition foreign policy. Furthermore, public opinion seems to prefer warmer relations with Europe rather than the Middle East or Russia: 22 percent of Turks favoured 'closer cooperation' with the countries of the European Union on 'international matters' compared to only ten percent and three percent choosing countries of the Middle East and Russia respectively, according to last year's Transatlantic Survey by the German Marshall Fund. Forty-three percent in the same survey preferred Turkey to 'act alone', an isolationist streak fostered by the country's republican founders. Most revealing of all, almost half of respondents still consider EU membership a 'good thing', a figure that has been increasing in recent years despite the open hostility expressed by France and Germany. Given the legacy of the Republic's founders, it comes as no surprise that Ankara cooperated with the US to defeat 'godless' communism, built low-key relations with Israel - except for unusually close ties in the latter half of the 1990s - and applied for EU membership in 1987. At home, it was preoccupied with challenging the perceived left-wing threat to the nation's Sunni Islamic heritage. Foreign policy is an uneasy coexistence between ideology and pragmatism, a reflection of the domestic imbalance between religious nationalism and secular citizenship. Since the early 1990s, the confluence of domestic and international events, ranging from the gradual consolidation of civilian rule, to the 2003 Iraq war, the rapid adoption of modern communication technologies, and the vagaries of EU accession, are forcing people to confront the contradictions of balancing between the twin perspectives. Similarly, the outcome of the Turkey- Armenia reconciliation and Cyprus, whether positive or negative, are encouraging a rethink. Muddling through these two mutually exclusive ideologies is no longer sustainable. A choice needs to be made between a state and society based on secular citizenship or one anchored in religious nationalism. That rethink is going on with minimal intervention from outsiders such as the EU. Possible outcomes Predicting the future course of these internal discussions is fraught with imponderables and uncertainty. Nevertheless, the early indications are that the nation is moving closer to secular citizenship: the precipitous decline in popularity of the AKP and the military, public displeasure with the existing political class, the appearance of non-ideological, centrist political movements and a maturing debate on the Kurdish issue, Armenia and the role of religion in state and society. Naturally, the process would have been greatly eased by a smoother EU accessionprocedure; the flip side is that Turkey is taking full ownership of the change. Whatever the signs, the outcome is not a foregone conclusion. It is possible - just possible - that Turkey will come to embody the often-forgotten continuation of Kipling's ballad: 'But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed, nor Birth, When two strong men stand face to face, tho' they come from the ends of the earth!' Fadi Hakura, Associate Fellow, Europe, Chatham House Tue, 23 Feb 2010 14:53:10 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/2004/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/2004/ There is relief that human cases of Swine Flu have so far turned out to be less lethal than expected for many people. Understanding of the need to be prepared is beginning to replace annoyance over expensive unused vaccine stockpiles. But pandemic alerts might be avoided altogether with a new approach aiming to deal with diseases before they spread from animals. 'When you hear hoof beats in the barnyard, think of horses, not zebras'. This age-old adage is often used when teaching medical students not to overlook common causes of disease in patients. But based on our current understanding of new or emerging infectious diseases, we might have to rethink this advice. Emerging infectious diseases are often associated with animals; some common, some not. Their names indicate their origin: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) or Mad Cow Disease; Human Monkeypox; and Avian Influenza. Thinking of zebras in addition to horses is essential to ensure early detection of these infections that are usually caused when microbes cross the species barrier from animals to humans. The recent pandemic of Swine Flu (H1N1) is a good example. It was first detected in humans in north America in April last year; is thought to have come from pigs, in which the mutant virus has been found, and has infected millions of humans. The death rate is similar to that of seasonal influenza, though the deaths from this virus predominately occur in younger age groups. However, as long as the virus continues to circulate, there is a risk it could mutate into a more virulent form. To prevent a potential epidemic or pandemic, the detection and response to outbreaks of emerging infections must be rapid. Detection most often occurs in infected humans, and the response is frequently aimed at culling the animals from which the infectious agent has come. A change in approach is required if human sickness and death from emerging infections, and negative impact on economies, are to be minimised. The shift must ensure that microbes with the potential to cross the species barrier are first identified and controlled in animals, to prevent human infection. It is also important to bear in mind that domestic livestock are not the only animals involved in the emergence of infectious diseases in humans. Wild animals can also play a role. The outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003 is thought to have been caused by a mutant virus from wild animals sold in markets in the Guangdong Province of China. Infected urine from wild rodents in Malaysia was implicated in an outbreak of Leptospirosis among athletes participating in a jungle triathlon in 2000. A number of factors are thought to be involved in the increased risk of new infections emerging from livestock and wild animals, and of their spread to humans. Habitat loss to accommodate cities and agricultural land has brought wild animals and humans into closer proximity. Rising demand for meat and dairy products - driven in particular by income growth and urbanisation in the major developing economies - has led to more intensive livestock production, while human population growth and urbanisation have resulted in higher population densities. These trends are thought to ease breeches in the species barrier between animals and humans. Increased trade, travel and human migration in turn allow infectious diseases to spread quickly around the world. Economic states The need for a new approach is particularly apparent where major economic and trade interests are at stake. And with global meat exports valued at around $92 billion dollars in 2007, the potential risks are high. Avian Influenza (H5N1) among chickens has been most acute in east and Southeast Asia, where the majority of human infections and confirmed deaths have also been recorded. Infection has spread to Europe through the poultry trade, and is thought by some to have also resulted from the migration of infected wild birds. The economic impacts of the disease have been significant. In Indonesia, for instance, poultry exports dropped by 97 percent at the height of the outbreak. An estimated 240 million poultry died or had been culled worldwide by the end of 2006. The World Bank estimates that a highly fatal pandemic of Avian Influenza among humans could cost the global economy as much as $800 billion a year. Trade restrictions imposed on beef when BSE was first recognised in United States cattle were estimated to have cost the American economy $11 billion, while British beef exports virtually collapsed when it was understood in the mid-1990s that humans were at risk from infected cattle. The Mexican government estimates that the Swine Flu outbreak has cost the economy at least $2.2 billion. A small portion of this loss has come from direct costs because of human illness and death, but the largest amount is a result of lost revenue as tourism and trade have decreased. Sometimes the economic impacts can arise from somewhat irrational, if understandable, reactions. Swine Flu is again a good example. Once the disease had made that initial jump across the species barrier from pigs, the virus spread by transmitting itself directly from human to human. Although the virus did not spread among people by repeated human infection from pigs or pork, pork prices in the US fell significantly in response to consumer concerns. Egypt culled hundreds of thousands of pigs, ostensibly to protect against Swine Flu. These reactions led some to suggest renaming the disease to reduce connotations with pigs and pork. Engaging livestock producers will require an appreciation of the economic challenges that the sector faces. The risk of trade restrictions is often seen as a disincentive for livestock producers to report outbreaks. Cutting that risk by appropriate animal infection control may be the most cost-effective means of preventing such restrictions in today's globalised world, and would contribute to the new approach. Similarly, where vaccines are available to prevent animal infections, producers may prefer to run the risk of infection rather than face the expense of vaccinating their animals, in particular when they are also dealing with other diseases that have more immediate consequences for livestock production. It is also important to recognise that in the absence of compensation, farmers have little incentive to report outbreaks if it results in the culling of their animals. International action The Avian Influenza experience has demonstrated that effective disease surveillance and response in one country may require action in others. International collaboration in controlling global outbreaks included financial and technical support from the United Nations system and multilateral donors, with a focus on Southeast Asia where the disease was most prevalent. Efforts are also needed to gather political support, given that countries may be dealing with other policy priorities that are of greater domestic concern. International organisations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), the World Bank, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and others can play a key role, especially in finding answers to questions such as who should lead and who should pay. A number of mechanisms are being implemented by these organisations to reduce the risks. These include the appointment of a United Nations System Influenza Coordinator (UNSIC) who ensures that the UN agencies, especially those dealing with human and animal health, work together on pandemic influenza preparedness and response; and the establishment of the Global Early Warning and Response System for Major Animal Diseases, including Zoonoses (GLEWS). Reducing risk Diseases at the human/animal interface pose particular challenges, requiring collaboration not only between countries but also between wildlife, agricultural and human health sectors to avert potentially devastating impacts on ecosystems, livestock production and human health. International cooperation is needed for global alert and response, at times including trade and agricultural measures to minimise risks. Assistance to developing countries is also necessary to help them combat the emergence of diseases before they can spread around the globe. Global partnerships are starting to address some of these challenges by adding a new and coordinated dimension to health at the human/animal interface. The goal of these partnerships is to move towards preventing the emergence and establishment of animal-derived human infections, rather than responding to them when they are already spreading. More effective engagement of the wildlife and livestock sectors in international and national strategies is fundamental to achieving this goal. So now, when you hear hoof beats in the farmyard, think of zebras as well. Heike Baumüller, Senior Research Fellow, Energy, Environment and Resource Governance, Chatham House David L Heymann, Head and Senior Fellow, Centre on Global Health Security, Chatham House Tue, 23 Feb 2010 14:19:20 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/2002/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/2002/ In January, there was a rare event in Africa. Military rulers agreed voluntarily to hand over power to civilians, under pressure from donors but not under force of arms. The full transfer of power in the West African nation of Guinea has to wait until elections, set for June, although a transitional government of civilians and the military is already being formed. If things go well, Guinea could be governed by a democratic administration for the first time in its history. But there might be a spoiler: Chinese interests have sealed huge mineral deals. Guinea's path to democracy is by no means assured. There are still many in the military who wish to retain power and they will be one of the major obstacles as the country tries to break away from dictatorial rule, more than fifty years after independence from France in 1958. The competition for power will be all the fiercer as international companies jostle for control of the country's enormous reserves of bauxite - the ore from which most aluminium is produced - and iron. World prices for both these commodities are rising steeply, increasing the stakes. Guinea also has diamonds, gold and uranium. Exploration is under way to see if its coastal waters hold oil. There is a risk investors who benefited from the military regime could back their friends, or that the proceeds from multibillion dollar investments could be siphoned-off by powerful elements of the military; a particular worry in a country where the existence of ethnic militias had been raising fear of factional fighting. Guinea is situated in a troubled region. Its West African neighbours have all gone through civil war since the late 1980s, with Liberia and Sierra Leone suffering particularly grievously at the hands of drugged-up armies including many child soldiers. Côte d'Ivoire experienced a civil war in 2002-2003 after ethnic rivalry in its army, and is still divided between a rebelheld north and government-controlled south. Among Guinea's investors, China - or Chinese firms - now bears the most responsibility to ensure it in no way fuels instability. Since the current military regime took power in a 2008 coup, Chinese companies have come close to taking over Guinea's economy entirely, as other multinational investors have had property confiscated, or been paralysed by political uncertainty. Junta violence Guinea's junta took power in December 2008, after the death of Lansana Conté, its dictator of 25 years. The head of the junta, 44- year-old army Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, named himself president and followed a familiar path for African dictators. He gained popularity at first by leading a campaign against corruption, personally interrogating alleged drug traffickers on television. He promised new elections in which he would not stand, then backtracked, suggesting he would put himself forward as a candidate after all. The opposition cried foul and when it tried to demonstrate in a sports stadium, there was a massacre by the military: at least 156 killed and dozens of women raped and sexually abused, according to a United Nations report. The killings confirmed the pariah status of Guinea's new regime. The European Union, African Union and the United States all imposed sanctions. France suspended its military aid. The UN experts' report on the massacre recommended the International Criminal Court prosecute those responsible, singling out Camara and close aides. Then, last December, the head of the presidential guard, Lieutenant Aboubacar Toumba Diakité, shot Camara in the head at close range during an argument over who should take responsibility for the killings. Camara was flown to Morocco for treatment and, incredibly, survived. In the meantime, however, his deputy, Sekouba Konaté, took over. It was Konaté who arranged for the powersharing government, with opposition figure Jean-Marie Doré as interim prime minister. Riches or illusion? Under Camara, Chinese companies struck a mega-deal with Guinea. A company called China International Fund has agreed to invest at least $7 billion. Under the terms of the deal, the Fund and Guinea set-up a company based in Singapore, which would hold the rights to all of the country's oil, gas and minerals, other than those already subject to existing contracts. The joint company - the Guinea Development Corporation - is committed under the agreement to build major infrastructure projects in Guinea, including: a long-dreamt-of railway to transport the country's unexploited iron ore reserves to the coast; a new deep-water port to export this ore; and three new hydroelectric dams, which could help power new aluminium smelters. Such projects, if carried out successfully, would transform the Guinean economy, which has more than half the world's bauxite reserves and is the world's largest exporter of the commodity. Not all in Guinea are happy about the deal, however. 'How can you believe that we could inject so much money into the Guinean economy, while the gross domestic product of the country is only $3 billion?' Sidya Touré, an opposition leader and former prime minister, said after negotiations were opened. Referring to some of the infrastructure projects promised by China, he added: 'Where are the cars that will be driving on these highways? Where are the trains? We must be serious. All this is illusion.' The extent of China's involvement in the economy goes even further, as negotiations have been opened to sell the Guinean assets of other companies to Chinese interests. These include oil exploration rights covering virtually all the coastal waters. China could also benefit from a spat over the mammoth Friguia aluminium refinery and mining complex some ninety miles northeast of the capital Conakry. In April 2008, Camara publicly lambasted a 2006 deal under which Russian firm United Company RusAl gained control of Friguia, saying RusAl had bought it from the state at well under a tenth of its true value. A court has ruled the purchase invalid and the Minister of Mines, Mahmoud Thiam, is threatening to confiscate Friguia, unless RusAl pays out $860 million. The government says it has already opened talks with China on the sale of the mine. RusAl plans to fight its corner through international courts. The role of the Chinese state in all this is unclear. While the Chinese government denies having anything to do with the China International Fund, a Chatham House report published last year, Thirst for African Oil, suggests it may have links to the Chinese security services. Along with the China International Fund and its partners, others to have done well under the military regime include diamond billionaire Benny Steinmetz, the fifth richest person in Israel. Under former President Conté, Australian mining multinational Rio Tinto Zinc was stripped of half of its iron ore mine in Simandou, southern Guinea, and saw it handed to Steinmetz's BSGR. When Camara was inpower, a Guinean court upheld the decision. Rio Tinto had invested $400 million in the mine and planned to invest $10 billion more, with the aim of making it the biggest iron ore mine outside Australia and Brazil. Rio Tinto said late last year that it was trying to resolve the matter with the Guinean authorities by negotiating 'in good faith'. Other multinationals have had problems under the military, including US mining giant Alcoa which reportedly faced official opposition when it evacuated its expatriates after the coup. Australia's BHP Billiton appears to have put its plans for a 5.4-million-ton capacity aluminium refinery on hold until it becomes clearer what Guinea's long-term political future will be. The China International Fund, unlike BHP Billiton and others, does not seem to regard the instability of military rule as a brake on its ambition. Far from it, the company seized on the coup to strike deals potentially giving it overwhelming control over the economy. The resources-for-infrastructure agreement mirrors other multibillion-dollar deals by Chinese interests elsewhere in Africa, including in other pariah regimes such as Zimbabwe and Sudan. As in Guinea, China's rising demand for resources trumped any concerns over human rights violations. China's trade with Africa has multiplied more than ten times since 2001, reaching $100 billion in 2008. It has developed tight links and shared interests with a number of the continent's dictatorships and repressive regimes. It may be too much to hope that the Chinese communist dictatorship joins the west in supporting Guinea's efforts to become a democracy. The question is - will its economic interests make it a spoiler? Daniel Balint-Kurti, Associate Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House Tue, 23 Feb 2010 12:14:59 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/2001/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/2001/ Demand for oil has fallen dramatically in the worst recession since the 1930s, yet oil prices doubled in the year to January. What is behind these apparently contradicting moves and where are prices heading now? One of the main problems in considering future oil prices is to understand how international oil markets actually work. There are two markets for oil: the wet barrel and the paper barrel. In the wet barrel oil market, real people trade real barrels of crude oil and its products either on an immediate 'spot', or term-contract basis. The paper barrel market trades promises to buy. The two most prominent paper markets are New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) in London. Players on paper markets are conventionally classified as commercials and non-commercials. The commercials are the 'real' people operating in the wet barrel market; the noncommercials are rather more shadowy. The key players among the latter are 'money managers' who manipulate large financial portfolios switching between various financial investments. These are not the same as speculators who move in and out of the market on a daily and weekly basis trying to outguess price volatility. They see commodities like oil as an asset class in their diversified portfolios and buy them expecting prices to rise. Interactions between the two markets are complex. Only in limited cases - and only on NYMEX - is there actual physical delivery of a barrel of crude. One key link concerns perceptions. When negotiating contracts, wet barrel markets have to start somewhere to agree price. Normally they look at the paper markets for guidance. Similarly, paper markets look at wet barrel markets to determine real physical surplus or shortage, and then adjust their financial positions accordingly. Another important link lies in the shape of the forward price curve and the attractiveness of holding physical stocks. If the forward curve is in 'contango' - future prices are higher than current prices and the difference can cover the cost of storage - it makes sense to hold physical stocks. If the forward curve is in 'backwardation' - future prices are below current prices - then it make sense to unload physical stocks. Misreading markets A major problem with perceptions between the two markets is that money managers, although very smart people, do not really understand the international oil industry. They often misread the wet barrel market. On five occasions between 2000 and 2005 they believed there was a shortage when there was not. When they realised their mistake, the price lost $10 in a week as they pulled out. At the end of 2006, when they had pushed the price to over $70, the realisation of no shortage led to a rapid $20 fall. Most spectacularly, they misread the market in the first half of 2008 pushing prices to an historical high of $147 early in July. When the error was realised, the price fell $40 by late August. Then the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the subsequent financial meltdown caused prices to crash to less than $40 in December 2008. Such behavior is not entirely explained by misunderstanding; money managers must consider other things than simply the state of the wet barrel market. One reason money poured into commodities before mid-2008 was that alternative investment classes in the portfolios - government bonds and equities - were seriously bad news. There was nowhere else to put the money other than commodities. Also there was a Pavlovian response to dollar devaluation. If you believe a weaker dollar increases oil prices, the prospects of a weaker dollar induces salivation from the money managers, causing money to flow into paper oil, pushing up the price. This despite the fact that the transmission mechanism for such a link is not at all obvious. Demand down, stocks up Since the start of the global economic recession, oil demand has fallen dramatically - by 0.4 million barrels per day in 2008 and, based on a consensus forecast, 1.7 million barrels per day last year. The result was a dramatic increase in spare capacity to produce crude, reaching nearly twenty percent last year, compared with almost zero in 2004. Of even greater importance for future oil prices, is that oil stocks have risen to levels unprecedented in recent times. However, at the same time, because the forward price curve is in contango - rises are expected - such large stocks are welcome for those holding them. Despite this over-supplied market, oil prices have risen from below $40 per barrel in December 2008 to $80 in January. This raises a key question over yet another possible disconnect and whether 'other things' are occupying money managers. Clearly they are. Despite the worst global recession since the 1930s, last year commodity prices saw the bigggest annual gain since records began in 1970. Thus the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index recorded a record annual rise of just over fifty percent. This was driven by a widespread perception that there were commodity shortages, confirmed by the data, although as outlined, not for oil. Given this context, several factors determine prospects for oil prices this year: Can oil demand growth absorb the surplus stock, tighten the market, and maintain the rise in prices seen last year? This will depend very much on the strength of economic recovery. So far, globally, this has been weak, despite strong emerging markets in Asia. If oil stocks remain high, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) only option is to cut production further. There are two problems. Compliance with existing cuts has been weakening, aggravating OPEC divisions. Also, if prices remain at current levels, further formal cuts would not go down well politically. Meanwhile there is a fear that if for any reason the forward curve moved into backwardation - expecting lower prices - the subsequent unloading of stocks could significantly reduce oil prices. Will money managers continue to push money into commodities, forcing prices higher? The signs are that this could happen. Government bonds look unattractive given serious budget deficits following counter recessionary policies. The recovery in equity markets remains vulnerable to a double-dip recession. Given strong perceptions of impending shortages across a range of commodities, paper markets look attractive and did pay handsomely last year. The perceived link between dollar devaluation and the oil price is also alive and well. The oil market remains vulnerable to supply disruption from some geo-political event. Iran is a prime candidate, but there are a number of others, ranging from Venezuela to Nigeria and Iraq, despite some analysts' optimism on these last two countries. In part, it is these geo-gitters that supported oil prices last year and could well continue to do so. Because of the way paper markets operate, simple rumours of upheaval can move prices dramatically. Equally demand disruption could have an impact. Normally this would not be likely, but if anything happened seriously to derail Chinese economic growth, it would have a major impact on paper markets. All that can be said is that while, on the balance of probability, oil prices may hover around the $80 mark this year, there are significant uncertainties which could cause serious price volatility. In short, the price of oil could go up or down, but not necessarily in that order. Paul Stevens, Senior Research Fellow, Energy, Environment and Resource Governance, Chatham House Tue, 23 Feb 2010 11:57:11 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/1999/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/1999/ In his now famous Prague speech last April, United States President Barack Obama endorsed the vision of a world without nuclear weapons. He sent a strong political signal: if repairing the fragile nuclear nonproliferation arrangements required a credible disarmament commitment by the nuclear weapons states, America was willing to lead by example. But setting that example could become much more complex if a whole host of new nuclear states is to be avoided. The American nuclear umbrella is still needed to shelter many nations, preventing them from pursuing their own nuclear paths. The approach of the United States administration is clear. A strong commitment to arms control and nonproliferation, including hosting a summit meeting on nuclear security in April, should prepare the ground for a successful Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, scheduled for May. Such a success would help foster a new consensus between the nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states about adopting more far-reaching nonproliferation measures. However, maintaining effective global nonproliferation requires more than a new dynamic in arms control and disarmament. There is another dimension that will be at least as important as cutting existing nuclear arsenals: the US nuclear umbrella, America's willingness to extend nuclear deterrence to allies and friends. While some arms controllers are quick to dismiss extended deterrence as a relic of the past and an obstacle to deep reductions of the US nuclear posture, a closer look reveals that the nuclear umbrella is still a cornerstone of a predictable international order. Without it, the emergence of new nuclear nations would be a foregone conclusion. Today, more than thirty nations rely on extended US deterrence, including the members of NATO, South Korea and Japan. In addition, several other states without formal defence agreements, like Australia and Taiwan, are also believed to be beneficiaries of the umbrella. These extended commitments have become a major nonproliferation tool. American protection satisfies the security interests of allies and thus dampens any temptation to develop nuclear weapons of their own. Current developments in Asia and the Middle East demonstrate that the significance of extended deterrence has not changed. With Iran and North Korea challenging the political and military status quo in their respective regions, US security guarantees are crucial to nuclear nonproliferation. No longer taboo Japan is one prominent example. The country's growing nervousness about China's military rise and the nuclear threat posed by North Korea, has provoked a debate about a national nuclear option that would have been unthinkable only a few years ago. To be sure, a short-term reversal of Japan's anti-nuclear stance remains highly unlikely. Still, the case of Japan brings home that even seemingly irreversible policy principles can change if a country is confronted with new security challenges. When faced with a fundamentally altered security landscape, yesterday's taboo can become tomorrow's mainstream view. While Japan never actively sought nuclear weapons, most experts agree that Taiwan and South Korea once tried. Taipei and Seoul had both been laying the groundwork for a national nuclear option to hedge against a worsening regional security situation. It was only after the US intervened politically that the programmes were terminated. For the time being, at least, the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region bridles nuclear ambitions and spares Southeast Asia a nuclear arms race. Nuclear escalation risks The situation in the Middle East and the Gulf is far less encouraging. Since the uncovering of Iran's illicit nuclear activities in 2002, more than a dozen countries in the region have announced the launch of civilian nuclear programmes. Many experts believe that these decisions are part of a strategy to hedge against the regional dominance of a nuclear-armed Iran. Hence, should Iran start to throw its nuclear weight around, neighbouring countries could quickly convert their civilian nuclear capabilities into military ones. Europe would then be faced with a neighbouring region where every conventional conflict would be fraught with nuclear escalation risks. And what about Europe? Given the improving security situation since the end of the Cold War, there has not been a debate about extended deterrence for a long time. Some analysts have warned that Turkey might flirt with a nuclear option should Iran go nuclear, but few believe Europe as a whole is facing serious proliferation pressures. However, the interest in a tangible American security commitment remains unchanged. The war between Russia and Georgia in mid 2008 made this abundantly clear. It led some of NATO's easternmost members to ask publicly for changes in its military planning and deployments. Moreover, the desire of these countries to host American military installations on their national soil, and the nervousness they display about a prospective withdrawal of the remaining US nuclear weapons from Europe, demonstrate that what Josef Joffe has called 'Europe's American Pacifier', is still in demand. All these developments bring home what many disarmament enthusiasts dare not admit: the nonproliferation successes of the past forty years were not just a result of the nonproliferation Treaty or arms control, but also of extended US deterrence. The nuclear abstinence of many states in pivotal geopolitical regions is neither a law of nature nor the result of a universal nonproliferation norm. Rather, these nations bank their security on a predictable international system. And, irrespective of the new debate about a 'post-American' world, that system is still being upheld by the US. Washington's nuclear policy thus faces a dilemma. In order to pursue long-term nonproliferation goals, the US and the other nuclear weapons states need to make a credible commitment to nuclear disarmament; yet the current nuclear reality requires credible US extended deterrence. If the US were to reduce or even end its role as a nuclear protector, this could result in the largest wave of proliferation since the dawn of the nuclear era. That is why the US needs to take great care in phasing prospective nuclear reductions in such as way as not to cast doubt about its willingness and ability to keep the nuclear umbrella open. A delicate balancing act indeed. Perhaps it explains why Obama, in his Prague call for the elimination of nuclear weapons, prefaced his optimistic 'yes, we can' with a less self-assured 'we must insist'. A small change in rhetoric, yet it says more about the challenges ahead than any lengthy think tank study. Michael Ruhle, Deputy Head, Policy Planning Unit, NATO. These are his personal views Tue, 23 Feb 2010 11:37:41 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/1998/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/1998/ Where does China stand on Iran and its nuclear plans? The two are tied together by huge energy deals. But Beijing is not best friends with Washington just now, so feels little pressure to help in its dispute with Tehran. Can it continue to stay on the diplomatic sidelines? The announcement in late January that Iran is China's third largest supplier of crude oil underlined for many the real heart of the relationship between these two countries. Despite all the warm words at the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, established by China almost a decade ago to bring together central Asian states and Russia about their close political and diplomatic links - which Iran attends as an observer - energy supply is the one thing that consistently appears in assessments of what holds China back from supporting tougher sanctions through the United Nations on Iran's nuclear programme. The figures are well known. A 25-year deal between China and Iran in 2004 for liquid natural gas. A $100 billion contract the following year for supply from the Yabaravan field. In January last year a further $1.75 billion Chinese deal signed to develop the North Azedegan oil field, and, only a few months later, $5.2 billion for the South Pars natural gas field. China is Iran's biggest export partner, and sells it back refined oil. This is just the most visible part of the pipeline. Fuel for the people Relations with Iran fit into the larger picture of China's burgeoning international energy diplomacy. With soaring energy needs, it cannot be too choosy in the partners it keeps. Beyond Iran, deals with African countries like Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have brought international condemnation. As always, internal matters explain Beijing's outward behaviour. With a government which places economic growth at the centre of its legitimacy, and which needs to pump out eight percent gross domestic product increases at least for the next five years, having the energy to achieve this is crucial. The Communist Party will be finished if it fails to improve the economic lot of its people. The critical importance of energy security was only underlined by the final establishment in January of a national energy commission, headed by Premier Wen Jiabao, pulling together all the different administrative, corporate and financial parts of the state in this critical area. This is not the first time China has tried to systematise its approach to this, cutting across internal vested interests, and supplying unity where frequently there is all too much territorial conflict. Because of its energy and resource needs, diplomatically, China likes friends. It sticks to diplomat Robert Cooper's observation that 'it is easier, and cheaper, to have friends than enemies.' Perhaps alone among the major powers, it preserves good relations with Middle East Islamic states, but also with Israel. And it almost totally avoids the political flack that gets chucked at America or European powers over claims of meddling in the region, despite the fact that it has such huge investments and interests there. Some might suspect that China is perfectly happy to see this region as a zone of United States interest, and keep well away from its complex political issues. But as in so many other areas, it is learning that having assets and supply sources abroad almost inevitably brings demands to take a firmer position and get involved with difficult foreign disputes. China's celebrated stance of non-intervention is likely to be tested to exhaustion in the coming months and years, with Iran as the most pressing current case. Big background Ironically, China's energy profile was also one of the key aggravators in the current clashes with the US. China is 75 percent dependent on fossil fuels. This lies behind its environmental problems. US State Department figures say that 25 percent of the air pollution in California is traceable to China. A recent Chinese government survey shows that its own figures for domestic water pollution were understated by as much as fifty percent. And yet the commitment to economic growth, whatever the environmental cost, continues. China's stance at the December Copenhagen Climate Change summit typified to many other countries its self-interested behaviour. Arguing that the largest responsibility for controlling emissions should go to the US and the European Union, one witness at a negotiating session claimed it stripped out all meaningful targets and benchmarks in any final agreement, leaving the much-criticised accord as the end product. Wen's perceived snub of US President Barack Obama, sending a junior official to talk to him at a critical part of the negotiations, was taken as a continuation of China's arrogant treatment of him when he went to Beijing and Shanghai at the end of November. But it was also seen as a sign that China was simply shirking its responsibilities. This caused criticism from developing countries too. Sales of military equipment to Taiwan in January - amounting to over $6.5 billion - deepened the problem. The row over China's currency policy has become a particular target for opprobrium from an America just emerging from recession. There is great anger over the perceived distortion in the international system, with claims China's undervaluation of its exchange rate has created further massive trade deficits. To make things worse, a clamp-down on dissidents in China, with one of the best known imprisoned for eleven years on Christmas Day, and Obama's meeting with the Dalai Lama in Washington, all happening in quick succession. This is the big background within which the issue of Iranian sanctions is set. Foot dragging Speaking in New York in late January, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that it was in China's long-term best interests to support sanctions against Iran and stop it developing a nuclear weapons capacity. This suggestion that Beijing look beyond the current situation might have some traction. The Chinese government has largely been a supporter of non-proliferation. After all, it has four nuclear powers on its borders: Russia, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. It has been a proactive supporter of non-proliferation arrangements and treaties. It certainly does not want to see outcomes in the Middle East that would affect it stable supply of energy. Conflict with Iran would impact on this badly. And it doesn't want to be internationally diplomatically isolated. That Russia is bending towards supporting a UN Security Council resolution and tougher sanctions will figure in China's calculations. Going it alone is simply not Beijing's current style. So despite the poor atmospherics between the US and China at the moment, and despite what is said publicly in Beijing, the likelihood is that China will passively support tougher action on Iran. It will try to preserve its good relations with the regime there by taking a back seat, dragging its feet until the last moment, and then grumbling while falling in line to show Iran that it is doing this against its will, and that, at heart, it is still a good friend. As with other areas, Beijing will show in this way that it can not only have its cake, but also eat it. But the longer-term question remains. It is one that bedevils China's diplomatic development and will do so as it continues to become one of the world's most powerful economies. How much longer can it continue to keep its head down and be all things to all people throughout the developing world, despite the fact that it has increasing assets and interests to preserve in these areas? How long can it continue not to take a leading role in the resolution of international issues, even when it would clearly be in its interests to be more actively involved? And most worrying of all, how long will it be before countries like Iran start looking towards China not just for economic backing, but for diplomatic support, in their clashes with the US? Those are the questions that are starting to become clear through the current issue of sanctions and China's support for Iran. Kerry Brown, Senior Research Fellow, Asia Programme, Chatham House Tue, 23 Feb 2010 11:27:49 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/835/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/835/ Despite the lack of progress in negotiations over the future of Jerusalem, the situation on the ground is not static. Dynamic developments are creating grave new realities which risk becoming irreversible. The settler-driven entrenchment of the Israeli government in East Jerusalem is reaching the point at which a peaceful division of the city between Israel and a future Palestinian state may no longer be possible. Current Israeli policies of segregation and exclusivity are leading to the 'warehousing' of Palestinian residents of the city and the abandonment of neighbourhoods. Further restrictions on housing, employment, residency rights and mobility are also causing the gradual expulsion of Palestinians. The prospects of a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem are receding while any withdrawal by the Israeli state would entail grave political risks for the Israeli polity. The cost of failure in Jerusalem is high. In addition to the resulting insecurity on both sides of the city and among the wider communities, further decline could ruin international efforts to revive peace negotiations. Wed, 17 Feb 2010 14:03:03 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/events/view/-/id/1450/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/events/view/-/id/1450/ 17:30, 24th February 2010 - Jerusalem is an iconic city for many, and its status under any two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains contentious. Yet the lack of progress in the negotiations towards this proposed agreement has become notorious, it has also obscured that fact that the conflict in the city itself is not static. Drawing upon research on other divided cities, the speakers will argue that Israeli policies of settlement and segregation mean the prospect of a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem is fading rapidly, whilst parts of the city of Jerusalem face abandonment and decline. This meeting will also mark the launch of the new Chatham House Briefing Paper, 'Jerusalem: The Cost of Failure' authored by the speakers. Mick Dumper is Professor of Middle East Politics at Exeter University. His main area of research has been on Final Status Issues in the Middle East Peace Process and he is the author of The Future of the Palestinian Refugees: Towards Equity and Peace (2007) and The Politics of Sacred Space: The Old City of Jerusalem and the Middle East Conflict (2001) Dr Wendy Pullan is Senior Lecturer in Architecture at the University of Cambridge and Fellow of Clare College. She is Principal Investigator of 'Conflict in Cities and the Contested State'. Her research focuses on cities and their institutions, especially in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. THIS MEETING IS FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS NOW CLOSED. For more information please contact the Middle East and North Africa Programme. Mon, 15 Feb 2010 17:02:39 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/events/view/-/id/1444/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/events/view/-/id/1444/ 10:00, 18th February 2010 - Creating conditions for economic growth and improving the transparency and efficiency of governance are key steps to a stable future for Yemen. The speaker will discuss the 10-point plan as a roadmap for reform, which sets out to tackle priority areas of concern and create economic momentum for the country over the coming 24 months. Jalal Yaqoub is Yemen's Deputy Finance Minister and a former Fulbright Scholar. He is the author of the 10-point plan for reform in Yemen. Attendance at this event is by invitation only. For more information please contact the Yemen Forum. More about the Yemen Forum >> Fri, 12 Feb 2010 14:10:42 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/news/view/-/id/933/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/news/view/-/id/933/ Britain's participation in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 marked a dramatic shift in the direction and focus of British relations with the Middle East. This new Chatham House book provides the first extensive examination of the impact of 9/11 on the UK's policy towards this critical region. The book places Britain's involvement firmly within the rich historical context which is essential for understanding the legacy of empire and demonstrates how the New Labour leadership willfully ignored the lessons to be learned from past experience. It also argues that Britain not only paved the way for US engagement in the Middle East, but also became tainted by association with a US project for reforming the region that has foundered. Dr Rosemary Hollis analyses in detail how the Blair government handled the Iraq crisis, invasion and fallout, including developments in relations with Iran. She also documents Britain's 'niche' role in the Middle East peace process, arguing that arms sales, trade and finance bind Britain to the Arab Gulf states. Praise for Britain and the Middle East in the 9/11 Era: 'A wonderful and fascinating contribution to our understanding of Britain's place in the morass created by 9/11. This is the first work to set these current events in their true historical context. An absolute must for anyone wishing to understand the UK's role in the wider Middle East.' Jon Snow, Newscaster, Channel 4 News 'Rosemary Hollis combines breadth of vision with painstaking attention to detail in this comprehensive analysis of New Labour and the Middle East. Anyone who wishes to understand the complexities of the region and the impact on British foreign policy of our relationship with the United States need look no further.' Sir Menzies Campbell MP, former leader, Liberal Democrats 'This account of Britain's role in the Middle East under New Labour is a well-written and significant contribution to our understanding of the modern Middle East. It not only sheds light on the Blair government's involvement in Arab-Israeli peacemaking and the post-9/11 'war on terror', but also enhances our understanding of EU involvement and US leadership. Yossi Alpher, former director, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 'Dr Hollis incisively dissects Britain's relations with the Middle East under New Labour as well as Blair's path to war in Iraq. This is as close to a definitive account as we are going to get for some time.' Tarak Barkawi, Senior Lecturer, Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge Notes to editors More details about the book >> The author Rosemary Hollis is available for interview. Please contact her directly on +44 (0)7866 459 662. Book launch Thursday 25 February 2010 18:00 - 19:00 British Foreign Policy in the Middle East Dr Rosemary Hollis Dr Maha Azzam, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House Sir Harold Walker, HM Ambassador to Iraq (1990-91); President, British Society for Middle Eastern Studies Register: pressoffice@chathamhouse.org.uk About the author Dr Rosemary Hollis is Director of the Olive Tree Scholarship Programme and Visiting Professor at City University, London. She was previously Director of Research (2003-5) and Head of the Middle East Programme (1995-05) at Chatham House. Her research focuses on international political and security issues in the Middle East. During the 1980s she was a lecturer in Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University in Washington, DC, where she gained a Ph.D. in Political Science. She also holds a BA in History and an MA in War Studies from the University of London, King's College. For all other media enquiries Nicola Norton: +44 (0)20 7957 5739 pressoffice@chathamhouse.org.uk ENDS Fri, 05 Feb 2010 11:57:24 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/832/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/832/ Diplomatic efforts aimed at bringing Israel and the Palestinians back to the negotiating table, however concerted, are not sufficient by themselves to change the underlining dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They need to be accompanied by swift progression to implementation, with international monitoring, training and support. The deployment of a robust international peacekeeping presence in the West Bank and Gaza is increasingly considered a key part of creating and maintaining momentum towards realizing positive change on the ground. An international peacekeeping mission would primarily work in partnership with the Palestinian Authority to assist in the rebuilding of its governance capacities. Containing both military-security and civilian components, it would serve as a bridge until trust is rebuilt between Israel and the Palestinians and would transform the broader conflict environment. International intervention should not be seen as inimical to Israel's strategic concerns and security interest. It can assist Israel in meeting many of the security challenges it currently faces, facilitate Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation and monitor Palestinians' compliance on their commitments to combat terrorist operations against Israel. Any form of international intervention would demand the sustained commitment of the contributing nations, in terms of both political support and material costs. It would also need to be considered as part of a broader policy initiative, which could act as a catalyst for a change in Israel's overall security environment and its broader strategic concerns. Project International Intervention and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict >> Tue, 02 Feb 2010 13:56:41 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/events/view/-/id/1435/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/events/view/-/id/1435/ 18:00, 25th February 2010 - THIS MEETING IS FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS NOW CLOSED. To mark the publication of her new book, Rosemary Hollis will discuss Britain's relationship with the Middle East. She will suggest that Britain's decision to join the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was more than just another episode in the history of British accommodation to American ascendancy after its own imperial 'moment' had ended. She will argue that this was a fateful decision which made Britain a junior partner in an adventure that has rocked the region, emboldened radical elements and left US influence diminished. Copies of Dr Hollis's book will be available to purchase at the discounted rate of £14 for members. For more information, please contact Members Events. Tue, 26 Jan 2010 12:54:07 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/news/view/-/id/922/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/news/view/-/id/922/ Chatham House is pleased to have been ranked the 'No. 1 think-tank based outside the United States' by an international survey for the second year in a row. It is also listed as the top think-tank in Western Europe and sixth among the 'top security and international affairs think-tanks' worldwide. The survey, 'The Global "Go-To Think-Tanks" 2009' is carried out under the leadership of Dr James McGann at the University of Pennsylvania and offers the most comprehensive ranking of the world's leading think-tanks. The survey was launched at the United Nations University Office at the UN, New York, on 21 January 2010. Director Dr Robin Niblett said, 'I am delighted that the work of Chatham House and its staff has been recognized in this way for a second consecutive year. The "think-tank" space is becoming increasingly competitive as existing institutions vie with new ones to offer ideas to policy- and decision-makers around the world. Chatham House continues to do a great job in anticipating some of the momentous shifts in the global balance of political and economic power such as that we have witnessed this past year. We cannot be complacent about the complex challenges that these shifts present to us analytically and institutionally and are committed to maintaining the reputation we have earned for independent analysis and creative thinking on international affairs.' Notes to editors Read Survey in full >> (pdf) Contact Chatham House Press Office pressoffice@chathamhouse.org.uk +44 (0)20 7957 5739 Tue, 26 Jan 2010 12:33:26 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/1997/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/1997/ Letters in response to our articles on a European diplomatic service and the International Criminal Court, from last month's edition. Tue, 26 Jan 2010 12:09:20 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/1996/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/1996/ More people live in cities than ever before, creating burgeoning demands for housing, services and infrastructure. Cities face the challenge ofmeeting these needs, in addition to problems of rapid development such as congestion, pollution and environmental degradation. Cities also need to tackle climate change by reducing carbon emissions and introducing adaptation measures. Thus, the wellbeing of current and future generations will depend largely on how well cities can grow in a sustainable manner. Tue, 26 Jan 2010 12:07:06 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/1995/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/1995/ Just over ten years since returning to democracy, after a turbulent twelve months, and shortly before fifty years of independence, Nigeria is again at a key point. Its President, Umaru Yar'Adua, is ill in Saudi Arabia, many are asking for constitutional clarity. In recent years the country has commendably wanted to set good standards abroad. Applying those standards at home is now more important than ever, for Nigeria and for Africa. Tue, 26 Jan 2010 12:05:19 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/1993/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/1993/ For the first time in a generation, defence has become an election issue in Britain. Over the last eighteen months the Conservative opposition has been highly critical of Labour's defence policy and its handling of the war in Afghanistan. This has tapped into a wider public sentiment which has separated support for the armed forces from its opposition to Britain's wars. Cost cutting and policy reviews are already out of step. Tue, 26 Jan 2010 12:00:45 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/1992/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/1992/ Whoever takes office after the British general election must conduct a comprehensive review of the country's posture in the Middle East. Siding with the United States, whoever presides in Washington, may seem logical, given the extent of US influence in the region. Yet anti-Americanism has dramatically increased since September 11 2001, because of the invasion of Iraq, the extent of US support for Israel and seeming disregard for Palestinian rights and grievances. A broader, more eclectic approach might be better, and Europe - including Britain - has clout. Tue, 26 Jan 2010 11:58:18 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/1991/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/1991/ Britain's general election - most likely in early May - will once again be heralded as the first true 'internet election' and once again, it will probably disappoint. Although much media attention has been given to the use of the internet in the last American presidential election and, from this, conclusions will be drawn about the internet's impact here, it is important to step away from the hyperbole and look at a few key facts and, most importantly, key differences. Tue, 26 Jan 2010 11:54:24 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/1990/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/1990/ For four years after 2001, a very successful programme dealt with development, poverty reduction and social justice in Afghanistan, but it was ultimately allowed to fail. Now it must be re-started. Two critical meetings - one in London, the other inKabul - should soon clarify the Afghan government's plan in these areas and how the international community will work with it. Fears that it will be costly are misplaced, because much of the money is poorly spent now and, in the right circumstances, the country can generate its own wealth. Success in Afghanistan can only be achieved with such an approach. Ebook version >> Tue, 26 Jan 2010 11:52:41 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/1989/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/1989/ The botched plot to bomb North west Airlines Flight 253 - believed to have been hatched in Yemen - has turned the media spotlight on terrorism in this strategic Arabian peninsula state. Speaking after the attempted attack, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown described Yemen as 'an incubator and potential safe haven for terrorism' that presents 'a regional and global threat.' Rising concern about the country's future has prompted the British government to host an urgent international summit on radicalisation there. Ebook version >> Tue, 26 Jan 2010 11:49:26 +0000 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/1988/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/1988/ Hundreds of thousands are likely to have died, millions are in need, their homes having been lost. Many wait for medical care. Safe water is in short supply and the rainy season starts in May. Could it have been different in Haiti? Would good planning have eased the pain of the shocks? Ebook version >> Tue, 26 Jan 2010 11:48:21 +0000