http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/rss/17 This feed contains all new International Affairs articles on the Chatham House website. http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2308/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2308/ Tue, 22 Jul 2008 11:35:01 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2307/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2307/ Tue, 22 Jul 2008 11:33:35 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2306/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2306/ Tue, 22 Jul 2008 11:31:24 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2305/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2305/ This article analyses the significance of the highly anticipated trial of Charles Taylor at The Hague which, after a false start in 2007, resumed in early January 2008. Starting with the historical background, the article assesses the major jurisprudential issues which are likely to be considered during the course of the trial and to fit the case within the broader context of other developments both within the Special Court of Sierra Leone and other international tribunals. The funding problems that have beset the court and issues such as the handling of witnesses are also considered. The final outcome of the trial is as yet uncertain but it may suggest ways forward in terms of bringing greater accountability into the field of international criminal law. Ultimately, both retributive and restorative justice must play their part in ending the impunity of war criminals, whatever their status in society. Tue, 22 Jul 2008 11:29:16 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2304/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2304/ How can negotiations be conducted to promote the legitimacy of international institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO)? Can negotiation procedures be designed so as to strengthen the WTO as an institution and the agreements it concludes? One reason for which the legitimacy of the organization is being questioned is its decision-making-especially negotiation- procedures. These have contributed significantly to recent setbacks in WTO talks. Yet proposals for procedural reform have not been subject to much discussion or review, in particular with no regard to content which may boost legitimacy. Justice and other values associated with legitimacy have generally not been addressed by trade experts, and conceptual tools for identifying what practical form their inclusion could take are lacking. This article reviews a variety of proposals, formal and informal, for reforming the WTO's negotiation procedures. It develops an approach to procedural justice which is used to identify the justice content in these proposals, based on four main principles. Drawing on this analysis, the article concludes by highlighting promising elements of reform. In so doing, it brings research literature on justice and negotiation to bear on current debates over the legitimacy deficit in international institutions, using the WTO as a significant case. More practically, the article helps to identify what more legitimate negotiation procedures may mean and require, and how their justice content may be assessed and increased. Tue, 22 Jul 2008 11:26:36 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2303/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2303/ The British military have embarked on a comprehensive process of transformation towards a network-enabled, effects-orientated, and expeditionary force posture. This has involved developing brand new military doctrine, organizational concepts, and technology. The US military are also transforming, and American military ideas about network-centric and effects-based warfare have influenced the British military. But the British have not simply aped their US ally. Rather, British military transformation has followed a different path. Hence, this article proposes a dynamic model of military innovation involving two international drivers: new operational challenges and military emulation; and three national shapers: resource constraints, domestic politics and military culture. This model is then applied to a detailed empirical analysis of the process and progress of British military transformation. Tue, 22 Jul 2008 11:23:24 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2302/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2302/ In November 2007, the heads of the ten member governments of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed a charter that will, once ratified, give the association a legal personality. The charter, significantly, requires more of its members than a reassertion of the traditional ASEAN norm of non-interference and the practice of consensus. The charter lists a number of novel goals among the organization's purposes: 'to strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.' In view of the wide economic and political disparities between the member states of ASEAN, this article examines whether strengthening democracy would in fact facilitate ASEAN's goal of becoming an integrated political, economic and security community. Rather than enhancing an integrated community, democratization would arguably create a faultline between the more politically mature and economically developed states and a northern tier of less developed, authoritarian single-party dominant regimes in South-East Asia. Moreover, given China's emerging political and economic importance to the region, such a strategy would, as if by an invisible hand, draw the more authoritarian ASEAN states into China's less than democratic embrace. This article concludes that rather than strengthening democracy, ASEAN's charter needs urgently to reinforce practices of rule governance and mechanisms of market integration to enhance both ASEAN's economic profile as well as the region's autonomy. Tue, 22 Jul 2008 11:20:53 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2301/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2301/ Russian foreign policy reflects an evolving balance between vulnerability and opportunity. For much of President Putin's second term, Russia has been on the defensive. Despite increasing economic strength, observed in greater activity and an apparently more confident rhetorical stance, Russian diplomacy reflected a sense of vulnerability in Moscow. Indeed, diplomacy was largely inward looking: on the one hand it was a tool with which to unite and mobilize the Russian population rather than confront the West; on the other hand, it was a means of preventing external interference in Russian domestic affairs. On another level, Moscow sees an international situation destabilized by the unilateral actions of the US and an attempt by the 'western alliance' to assert and export its value system. But Moscow also believes that the international situation has reached a moment of transition, one which presents an opportunity for a Russia that lays claim to a global role. Russian foreign policy reflects a broad consensus in Moscow that asserts Russia's status as a leading power with legitimate interests. This moment of opportunity coincides with Moscow's desire to rethink the results of the post-Cold War period and to establish Russia as a valid international player. Continuing constraints and recognition that its domestic priorities proscribe Moscow from seeking confrontation with the West, which it cannot afford. Nonetheless, the attempt to establish the legitimacy of sovereign democracy as an international model of development appears to represent an important development in how Russia will approach wider European politics. Tue, 22 Jul 2008 11:17:49 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2300/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2300/ Saudi Arabia, homeland of Osama bin Laden and 15 of the 19 hijackers of September 11, 2001, experienced low levels of internal violence until 2003, when a terrorist campaign by 'Al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula' (QAP) shook the world's leading oil producer. Based on primary sources and extensive fieldwork in the Kingdom, this article traces the history of the Saudi jihadist movement and explains the outbreak and failure of the QAP campaign. It argues that jihadism in Saudi Arabia differs from jihadism in the Arab republics in being driven primarily by extreme pan-Islamism and not socio-revolutionary ideology, and that this helps to explain its peculiar trajectory. The article identifies two subcurrents of Saudi jihadism, 'classical' and 'global', and demonstrates that Al-Qaeda's global jihadism enjoyed very little support until 1999, when a number of factors coincided to boost dramatically Al-Qaeda recruitment. The article argues that the violence in 2003 was not the result of structural political or economic strains inside the Kingdom, but rather organizational developments within Al-Qaeda, notably the strategic decision taken by bin Laden in early 2002 to open a new front in Saudi Arabia. The QAP campaign was made possible by the presence in 2002 of a critical mass of returnees from Afghanistan, a clever two-track strategy by Al-Qaeda, and systemic weaknesses in the Saudi security apparatus. The campaign failed because the militants, radicalized in Afghan camps, represented an alien element on the local Islamist scene and lacked popular support. The near-absence of violence in the Kingdom before 2003 was due to Al-Qaeda's weak infrastructure in the early 1990s and bin Laden's 1998 decision to suspend operations to preserve local networks. The Saudi regime is currently more stable and self-confident-and therefore less inclined to democratic reform-than it has been in many years. Tue, 22 Jul 2008 11:13:03 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2299/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2299/ This article assesses the rise of President Ahmadinejad from the perspective of the Weberian concept of charismatic authority. It argues that in re-engaging with an authoritative structure founded on charisma, the hard line political establishment of the Islamic Republic have returned to a traditional form of autocratic power which is inherently unstable. The cycle of distress and enthusiasm from which it grows generates a momentum and ideological polarization which the leaders of the Islamic Republic may find increasingly difficult to escape. Tue, 22 Jul 2008 11:09:29 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2298/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2298/ The Vienna negotiations on the final status for Kosovo were an impossible project. It was clear at the outset that both parties would not be able to find common ground on the status issue. However, the talks focused on the practical issues of governance in Kosovo, such as decentralization, community rights and cultural heritage. It was thought that these could be addressed, initially at least, in a status-neutral way. While the parties did not manage to agree on all or most of these problems, the UN Special Envoy, Martti Ahtisaari, generated a comprehensive proposal offering compromise solutions that should have been acceptable to both sides. The recommendation of the Special Envoy in favour of supervised independence was deliberately separated from the comprehensive proposal. It was thought that the UN Security Council would at least endorse the proposal, even if it was ultimately unwilling to pronounce itself in favour of independence. The issue of status might then be settled outside the Council. However, when it appeared to some states on the Council that endorsement of the substantive Ahtisaari plan would in fact be tantamount to acceptance of independence, this avenue was closed. Tue, 22 Jul 2008 11:03:20 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2297/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2297/ The US-led post 9/11 'intervention' in Afghanistan was, by definition, not a humanitarian intervention. The intervention in Afghanistan was defined as an act of self-defence by the US and it was one of the first steps in the 'war on terror' by the US and its allies: it had no intention or clear strategies for long-term stabilization, state-building or development. The US-led international coalition failed to 'find' Al-Qaeda in the short term and new arguments had to be made to justify continued international presence. The initial agenda was quickly blurred by a mismatch of intentions including those of long-term stabilization and state building. The ideas developed through the Bonn Agreement (2001-5) and continued through the Afghanistan Compact (2006-10) have focused on building a centrally governed state (sometimes defined as democratic) that has a monopoly on the use of force. Their shortcomings are already well-documented: the urgency of the Bonn Conference and of the adoption of the Bonn Agreement ostensibly meant trading expediency and stability for accountability and a clean slate, which is not to say that there were no good intentions at Bonn from stakeholders, but that Afghans and the international community put power-sharing before progress. The choices made at Bonn may have contributed to the culture of impunity and the entrenched poverty that is gripping Afghanistan today. This article responds to the claims that state-building and all that goes with it are not the responsibility of the 'international community' by addressing the accountability and humanitarian paradoxes. The question remains, however, about who should be responsible for reform and politically accountable in the aftermath of non-humanitarian (and indeed even humanitarian) interventions? Tue, 22 Jul 2008 10:59:44 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2296/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2296/ Tue, 22 Jul 2008 10:54:08 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2295/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2295/ Tue, 22 Jul 2008 10:51:44 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2294/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2294/ Tue, 22 Jul 2008 10:49:50 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2293/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2293/ The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has come a long way in a relatively short space of time. From inauspicious beginnings, the principle was endorsed by the General Assembly in 2005 and unanimously reaffirmed by the Security Council in 2006 (Resolution 1674). However, the principle remains hotly contested primarily because of its association with humanitarian intervention and the pervasive belief that its principal aim is to create a pathway for the legitimization of unilateral military intervention. This article sets forth the argument that a deepening consensus on R2P is dependent on its dissociation from the politics of humanitarian intervention and suggests that one way of doing this is by abandoning the search for criteria for decision-making about the use of force, one of the centre pieces of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001 report that coined the phrase R2P. Criteria were never likely to win international support, the article maintains, and were less likely to improve decision-making on how best to respond to major humanitarian crises. Nevertheless, R2P can make an important contribution to thinking about the problem of military intervention by mitigating potential 'moral hazards', overcoming the tendency of international actors to focus exclusively on military methods and giving impetus to efforts to operationalize protection in the field. Tue, 22 Jul 2008 10:46:34 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2292/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2292/ Thu, 08 May 2008 14:56:42 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2291/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2291/ Thu, 08 May 2008 14:55:30 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2290/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2290/ Thu, 08 May 2008 14:54:24 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2289/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2289/ The role of private market agents in global monetary and financial governance has increased as globalization has proceeded. This shift in both markets and patterns of governance has often been encouraged by states themselves in pursuit of liberalization policies. Much of the literature views these developments in a positive light, yet there are other aspects of these developments that also merit attention. This article supports its central propositions with two cases of emerging global financial governance processes: the Basel II capital adequacy standards for international banking supervision and the International Organization of Securities Commissions-based transnational regulatory processes underpinning the functioning of cross-border securities markets. Based on the case findings, the article argues first that private sector self-regulation and/or public-private partnership in governance processes can leave public authorities vulnerable to dependence on the information and expertise provided by private agents in a fast-moving market environment. Policy in the vital domain of financial regulation has been increasingly aligned to private sector preferences to a degree that should raise fears of bureaucratic capture. Second, the article contends that the overall outcome in terms of global financial system efficiency and stability has been mixed, bringing a range of important benefits but also instability and crisis for many societies to a degree that has led to challenges to global governance itself. The case material indicates that the input, output and accountability phases of legitimacy in global monetary and financial governance are highly problematic, and much of the problem relates to the way in which private market agents are integrated into the decision-making process. Third, the article posits that a better consideration of these three 'phases' of legitimacy and their interrelationships is likely to enhance the political underpinnings and legitimacy of global financial and monetary order. Thu, 08 May 2008 14:52:44 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2288/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2288/ The G8 has rather crept up on our consciousness as an agency of global governance. It was brought into being in 1975 in order to give western leadership to the global political economy at a time of uncertainty and drew Russia into its activities in order to demonstrate and symbolize the triumph of western capitalist liberal democracy over its rival Soviet system. In that sense the G8 constitutes the club of the winners of late twentieth century history. But it has long been beset by problems of legitimacy and efficiency. Some of the leaders of the current G8 states also recognize that global politics has moved on a long way since the settlements of 1945 and 1989 and increasingly acknowledge the need to address that changing reality. They recognize that some other powerful countries have grown up and that it is now in the interests of the dominant countries to accommodate a limited number of these new powers within the structure and norms of the contemporary governance of globalization. In this spirit the G8 as lately sought to incorporate Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa into its affairs, dealing with them as 'outreach' partners within a process that has been dubbed the 'G8 + 5'. For their part, these early twenty-first-century winners will have to show that they are willing to work within the framework of western leadership. That is what the 'G8 + 5' process is testing out. Only when, and if, these tests are passed will the formation of a G13 become a politically realistic possibility. Thu, 08 May 2008 14:49:35 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2287/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2287/ International economic power (the ability to shape rules of global economic conduct) needs to be understood in terms of the interactions between rule-makers and rule-takers in the global economy. Attempts to reshape development paradigms through interventions during financial crisis have been highly significant for the domestic political economy of the developing world. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the primary question was how much countries would liberalize in response to financial crisis. Reactions to the crises of the late 1990s in Asia and Latin America were more varied. This article explores domestic political responses to crises in both regions in the 1980s and late 1990s. It argues that countries are finding it increasingly difficult to trump domestic political pressure for change with arguments about technocratic necessity. Popular pressure is pushing governments into new experiments in economic nationalism, not a radical rejection of global economic integration, but a reshaping of relationships in an attempt to secure national interests and, in some cases, to devote more resources to welfare. Experiments to date are modest, but could presage more significant change in the future. Thu, 08 May 2008 14:47:45 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2286/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2286/ Global integration through trade and finance is the defining feature of today's international economic order. As mature industrial economies and emerging market economies become more integrated and interdependent, countries that play a key role in the global supply chain increasingly shape the world economy and influence its dynamics. How is the world economy changing? This article argues that a multipolar structure is an accurate description of the pattern in which the world economy is organized and power is distributed among players. Power is now more diffused, but not equally distributed; new players have increased their capacity for action, but not necessarily their influence. The balance remains tilted in favour of the old poles, with the United States in the strongest, albeit less dominant, position. In particular, there is a misalignment between the new poles' role in the global economy and their ability, and willingness, to influence institutions and participate in rule-setting. This is where the major source of potential tension and conflict lies in today's economic order. The combination of global financial markets and national politics has created a lopsided system where political arrangements are still based on the sovereignty of states and where the development of international institutions that could promote collective goods has not kept pace with the development of markets. Looming changes and fear of systemic collapse, especially in view of the current economic turmoil that has the potential to weaken global growth and impose huge strains on the international order, may spur action. However, whether this will trigger renewed efforts to rethink existing arrangements, improve global governance and strengthen the rules-based framework that underpins the global order remains an open question. Thu, 08 May 2008 14:44:42 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2285/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2285/ The European Union (EU) spreads its norms and extends its power in various parts of the world in a truly imperial fashion. This is because the EU tries to impose domestic constraints on other actors through various forms of economic and political domination or even formal annexations. This effort has proved most successful in the EU's immediate neighbourhood where the Union has enormous political and economic leverage and where there has been a strong and ever-growing convergence of norms and values. However, in the global arena where actors do not share European norms and the EU has limited power, the results are limited. Consequently, it is not only Europe's ethical agenda that is in limbo; some basic social preferences across the EU seem also to be unsustainable. Can Europe maintain, let alone enhance, its environmental, labour or food safety norms without forcing global competitors to embrace them? The challenge lies not only in enhancing Europe's global power, but also primarily in exporting rules and norms for which there is more demand among existing and emerging global players. This means that Europe should engage in a dialogue that will help it to establish commonly shared rules of morality and global governance. Only then can Europe's exercise of power be seen as legitimate. It also means that Europe should try to become a 'model power' rather than a 'superpower', to use David Miliband's expression. The latter approach would imply the creation of a strong European centre able to impose economic pains on uncooperative actors. The former would imply showing other actors that European norms can also work for them and providing economic incentives for adopting these norms. To be successful in today's world, Europe needs to export its governance to other countries, but it can do it in a modest and novel way that will not provoke accusations of 'regulatory imperialism'. Thu, 08 May 2008 14:42:34 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2284/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2284/ This article examines the dynamics of power and rule-setting in the international monetary system. It begins with a brief discussion of the meaning of power in international monetary relations, distinguishing between two critical dimensions of monetary power: autonomy and influence. Major developments have led to a greater diffusion of power in monetary affairs, both among states and between states and societal actors. But the diffusion of power has mainly been in the dimension of autonomy, rather than influence, meaning that leadership in the system has been dispersed rather than relocated-a pattern of change in the geopolitics of finance that might be called leaderless diffusion. The pattern of leaderless diffusion, in turn, is generating greater ambiguity in prevailing governance structures. Rule-setting in monetary relations increasingly relies not on negotiations among a few powerful states but, rather, on the evolution of custom and usage among growing numbers of autonomous agents. Impacts on governance structures can be seen on two levels: the individual state and the global system. At the state level, the dispersion of power compels governments to rethink their commitment to national monetary sovereignty. At the systemic level, it compounds the difficulties of bargaining on monetary issues. More and more, formal rules are being superseded by informal norms that emerge, like common law, not from legislation or statutes but from everyday conduct and social convention. Thu, 08 May 2008 14:40:18 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2283/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2283/ This article explores the relationship between power and rules within the context of international relations, utilizing as a case-study what is arguably the most powerful international juridical institution in the world today, the World Trade Organization (WTO). The author draws upon a number of his previous works on the subject of the WTO and its predecessor, the GATT, wending through such topics as: the way that political and diplomatic leaders improvized and filled in the gaps of international institutions when the original idea for an International Trade Organization (ITO) failed; the remarkably elaborate development of the particularly deep and rich WTO Dispute Settlement (DS) jurisprudence (over 60,000 pages); and the constant tension between the role of nation-state power and the power allocated to international institutions, apparently necessitated by the huge impact of 'globalization' and interdependency in world affairs (especially economic) today. Various specific issues and cases illustrate these tensions and allocations, including treaty interpretation techniques, the degree of deference towards the members' government actions, the arguments about the appropriate role of the 'adjudicators', and the delicately sensitive approach of the DS system towards clashes of policy necessitating 'balance'. Throughout, particular emphasis is laid upon the 'rule oriented' ('more legalization') approach of the WTO DS jurisprudence, both in reflection on the historical and current developments of that juridical system-from 'power oriented' to 'rule oriented'-and also in the important roles regarding tensions between 'sovereignty' concepts and international rule needs. Thu, 08 May 2008 14:36:48 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2282/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2282/ Three controversial concepts are central to discussion on how international order originates, how it operates, and ultimately how we should respect it: globalization, empire and natural law. Each of these is examined in turn in this article. The currently prevalent way of thinking about globalization simply as a system of inter-connections, of processes and networks that span national and cultural boundaries is likely to produce anti-globalization backlashes. Many people reach the conclusion that global rules are simply a euphemism for some sort of imperial or neo-imperial rule. Consequently, there is an increasingly intense discussion of the role of force and power in a global order. This article suggests an alternative mechanism for creating global order. The power of globalization rests not simply on material prosperity, but on the ability to communicate and share ideas as well as goods across large geographical and cultural distances. Natural law theories suggest that a sustained dialogue between apparenly rival traditions of thinking can lead to agreement on shared norms and values. Thu, 08 May 2008 14:34:41 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2281/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2281/ The aim of this special issue of International Affairs is to address the changing dynamics in the international economic system from an interdisciplinary standpoint, in order to unpack some of the emerging processes of globalization and to investigate the relationship between power and rule-setting. The idea is to bridge the gap between the traditional realist accounts of the international system that place the nation-state at the centre of the analysis, and the liberal, market-driven approach that focuses on the problems of an increasingly integrated global economy and fragmented political authority. The framing question is how the global order (governance) has to change in order to accommodate the enlargement of the playing field and in particular the emergence of fast-growing developing economies. How is this shift going to affect the distribution of power, both among nations and between state and non-state actors? Is this shift going to drive a fundamental rethinking of the rules governing relations betwen countries-and regions-and institutions? The thread that links the articles in this special issue is the rather benign view of globalization, leaning towards 'liberal ingenuity' that sees governance as a way to accommodate conflicting interests through institutions in such a way as to minimize the potential for conflict. Thu, 08 May 2008 14:32:43 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2280/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2280/ Thu, 08 May 2008 14:27:49 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2279/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2279/ Thu, 08 May 2008 14:26:30 +0100