http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/rss/17 This feed contains all new International Affairs articles on the Chatham House website. http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2408/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2408/ Thu, 02 Jul 2009 12:14:10 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2407/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2407/ Thu, 02 Jul 2009 12:13:25 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2406/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2406/ Thu, 02 Jul 2009 12:12:38 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2405/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2405/ The two books under review, The Tradition of Non-use of Nuclear Weapons, by T V Paul, and Deterrence: From Cold War to Long War. Lessons from Six Decades of RAND Research, by Austin Long, highlight the continued interest in the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence. Long traces the RAND Corporation's research on the subject, exploring the role that nuclear deterrence has played as a strategy of the Cold War. The author goes on to argue for the relevance of nuclear deterrence to the future strategic environment, considering threats from peer-competitors to non-state actors. By contrast Paul considers the rise and persistence of a tradition, or informal social norm, of non-use which has encouraged self-deterrence. Taken together, these books encourage further consideration of the relationship between nuclear deterrence and the tradition of non-use. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the two practices can successfully coexist if non-nuclear states have, as Paul suggests, already begun to exploit the existence of a tradition of non-use. Such deterrence failures, real or perceived, have profound implications for relationships between nuclear and non-nuclear states. Thu, 02 Jul 2009 12:11:42 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2404/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2404/ China's 30 years of reform are often presented as a seamless progression towards greater liberalization and opening up. This review article of Yasheng Huang's Capitalism with Chinese characteristics shows how the author makes a compelling argument about how radically China's economic reforms changed from before and after the Tiananmen Square incident in June 1989. The 1980s saw the pro-rural, largely equitable, and generally liberal economic policies, with a private sector able to find sources of capital from family or relationship networks, and the creation of a very flexible and largely unplanned town and village enterprise system across China. From the 1990s, however, China has been dominated by pro-urban, less equitable and much more heavily state-led economic policies. Shanghai exemplifies this, with a highly circumscribed non-state sector, stagnation of per capita GDP growth in favour of company growth, and the Pudong development area largely based on land grab, and disrespect for the private property rights of the former tenant farmers based there. China grapples with the legacy of this policy change in 1989 to this day, with an increasingly disenfranchised and impoverished rural population, and cities that are both unsustainable, but irrevocable. Thu, 02 Jul 2009 12:08:23 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2403/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2403/ Japan and China's ability to manage their bilateral relationship is crucial for the stability of the East Asian region. It also has a global impact on the security and economic development of other regions. For just as China's rise has inevitably involved an expansion of its global reach, so Japan's responses to the challenges posed by China have increasingly taken a global form, seeking to incorporate new partners and frameworks outside East Asia. Japan's preferred response to China's regional and global rise in the post-Cold War period has remained one of default engagement. Japan is intent on promoting China's external engagement with the East Asia region and its internal domestic reform, through upgrading extant bilateral and Japan-China-US trilateral frameworks for dialogue and cooperation, and by emphasizing the importance of economic power to influence China. Japan is deliberately seeking to proliferate regional frameworks for cooperation in East Asia in order to dilute, constrain and ultimately engage China's rising power. However, Japan's engagement strategy also contains the potential to tilt towards default containment. Japan's domestic political basis for engagement is becoming increasingly precarious as China's rise stimulates Japanese revisionism and nationalism. Japan also appears increasingly to be looking to contain China on a global scale by forging new strategic links in Russia and Central Asia, with a 'concert of democracies' involving India, Australia and the US. Nevertheless, Japan's perceived inability to channel China's rise either through regional engagement or through global containment carries a further risk of pushing Japan to resort to the strengthening of its military power in an attempt to guarantee its essential national interests. It is in this instance that Japan and China run the danger of a military collision. Thu, 02 Jul 2009 12:06:02 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2402/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2402/ The literature on China's regional rise reveals divergent understandings of why China changed its regional strategy and when such a transformation occurred. There are also different understandings of the extent of China's power in the region-or more often, the extent to which US power in East Asia is already challenged by China's regional rise. Nevertheless, there is a consensus of sorts over how Chinese policy has changed with an emphasis on a combination of proactive diplomatic initiatives and ever increasing economic interactions. After providing a brief overview of the existing literature, the main part of this article considers the role of China's 'soft power' in reconfiguring power relationships in East Asia. It suggests that while the US might have lost some of its ideational appeal, it is through working within existing frameworks and 'norms' (rather than establishing new revisionist alternatives) that China has had most success in assuaging fears of the consequences of its rise. However, the way in which others conceive of China's rise and Chinese power (and subsequently act) does provide a form of 'non-hard' power that might help China's leaders attain their regional objectives particularly in light of the continuing global economic crisis. Thu, 02 Jul 2009 12:01:51 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2401/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2401/ As its economic power, military strength and cultural influence expands, India draws ever closer to becoming a leading player in world politics. Yet relatively little is known about what Indians take to be the nature of international politics and, correspondingly, how their power and influence should be used. A survey of Indian political thought reveals sharp disagreements. Moralists wish for India to serve as an exemplar of principled action. Hindu nationalists want Indians to act as muscular defenders of Hindu civilization; strategists advocate cultivating state power by developing strategic capabilities; and liberals seek prosperity and peace by increasing trade and interdependence. This article argues that current trends indicate that India will increasingly prioritize its quest for prosperity and peace. But if this quest is thwarted by external threats, then calls to enhance India's military power will most probably grow louder, and be heeded more closely. Thu, 02 Jul 2009 11:47:43 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2400/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2400/ The American decision to deploy missile defence in Poland endangered the central myth of Putin's regime (Russia's rebirth as a Great Power), challenged the status of Putin as Russia's strongman, and introduced an additional uncertainty into the carefully scripted campaign for succession to Putin. It also hit the raw nerve of Russia's reliance on nuclear weapons. The character of Russian policy-making has guaranteed the worst-case scenario evaluation of the American programme. The Russian elite's world view has magnified the problems resulting from the deployment into fears of a window of vulnerability. Thu, 02 Jul 2009 11:46:25 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2399/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2399/ Historically the NATO allies have focused considerable attention on US 'extended deterrence' - that is, the extension by Washington of an umbrella of protection, sometimes called a 'nuclear guarantee'. A persisting requirement has been to provide the allies with assurance about the reliability and credibility of this protection. This article examines the definition of 'assurance' used by the US Department of Defense for most of the past decade and argues that it has drawn attention to long-standing policy challenges associated with US extended deterrence in NATO. The article considers the assurance roles of US nuclear forces in Europe, as well as elements of assurance in Washington's relations with its allies regarding extended nuclear deterrence. Whether the allies will retain the current requirements of extended deterrence and assurance in their new Strategic Concept or devise a new approach will be an issue of capital importance in the policy review launched at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit. Contrasting approaches to these questions are visible in the United States and Germany, among other allies. The main issues to be resolved include reconciling extended deterrence with arms control priorities; managing the divisions in public and expert opinion; and avoiding certain potential consequences of a rupture with established arrangements. Thu, 02 Jul 2009 11:43:45 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2398/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2398/ Preparations for the next UK defence review are under way; a struggle is imminent and the lines of battle are being drawn. There is a grave danger that in the new 'age of austerity' defence planning-and strategy generally-will be driven by tribal conflicts, either between supporters of one or other of the armed services or between contending viewpoints about the nature of conflict. And there will be others who will argue that the defence review should be driven simply by the need to reduce government expenditure, as quickly as possible. These arguments not only reduce the defence debate to a struggle between various incompatible and uncompromising tribal beliefs-'war among the fetishes', perhaps-they also miss the point. This article gauges the extent of the economic challenges which the UK defence establishment will confront over the coming decade. The authors consider how best to approach the problem of undiminished (and even expanding) commitments at a time of decreasing resources. They argue that defence planning should be driven by the notion of value (the ratio of function to cost), which in turn requires both a clear national political vision and a defence establishment which is output- rather than input-oriented. Finally, the authors assert that defence must transform itself to be able to achieve the outputs required in the most efficient and responsive manner. Read also: Blair's Wars and Brown's Budgets: From Strategic Defence Review to Strategic Decay in Less Than a DecadePaul Cornish and Andrew Dorman, International Affairs, March 2009 Thu, 02 Jul 2009 11:31:58 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2397/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2397/ One of the most striking financial developments in recent years is the emergence of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)-large publicly owned investment portfolios, which are growing rapidly in both number and size. In a global environment already roiled by a prolonged credit crisis, SWFs raise tricky and potentially controversial new questions for international financial regulation. One issue of concern to many in host countries is the possibility that some SWFs might be used for overt or tacit political purposes, posing a challenge for global monetary governance: a Great Tradeoff between the world community's collective interest in sustaining the openness of capital markets and the legitimate national security concerns of individual host countries. Can some balance between the two be found that will be both stable and acceptable to all concerned? Individually as well as collectively, recipient countries have begun to address the regulatory challenge directly. To date, however, accomplishments have been slight and have failed to stem a noticeable drift towards financial protectionism. A review of some recent proposals suggests that there is no foolproof solution to the Great Tradeoff. But the potential for controversy could be significantly reduced by a negotiated agreement among host governments addressing three key issues: definitions, risk assessment and dispute resolution. The most logical venue for such an exercise would be the OECD, building on its already extensive experience with international investment issues. Thu, 02 Jul 2009 11:28:52 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2396/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2396/ Political protest in Europe and the problematic politics surrounding bank recapitalization in the US have raised growing concerns about the rise of populist politics. Populist politics is problematic in its search for simplistic solutions to complex problems, its disdain for institutions and its political ambiguity. Nonetheless, the rise of populist mobilization also points to genuine concerns about the functioning of democracy. The politics of financial regulation has been dominated by a narrow, utilitarian and technocratic mode of policy-making that has tried to limit public debate, favouring an expert discourse which privileges questions of efficiency over questions of distribution. This article explores the distributional issues at stake in banking recapitalization (particularly questions about the returns governments receive for their investment) and regulation (through an exploration of the financialization literature). It argues that, while populist appeals to 'the people' are too ambiguous to be helpful, given the complexity of the interests at stake in financial regulation, there is a need for a wider and more democratic debate about financial regulation that pays greater attention to distributional issues. Populist mobilization can create pressure for debate, even if it presents few solutions. As a result, we should be wary of moves to shift too much regulation to the international level where populist mobilization is less effective. Thu, 02 Jul 2009 11:24:49 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2395/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2395/ Many insist that the world economy today is in the grip of the most severe financial crisis since 1931. Although the origins of this crisis are in dispute, the extent and scale of the changes prompted by it are becoming clear. Among these changes are a recalibration of the relationship between public and private authority, a reconfiguration of the regulatory responsibilities and capacities of the state with respect to the financial system, and a rebalancing of relations of power among states. While the financial crisis has generated points of stress along all of these axes of change, we should be wary of expecting an entirely new global financial order to emerge from the carnage. The complex links between financial order and world politics suggest that this financial crisis will result in an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary transformation in the world's financial order. Thu, 02 Jul 2009 11:20:48 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2394/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2394/ Thu, 02 Jul 2009 11:17:53 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2393/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2393/ Thu, 02 Jul 2009 11:16:33 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2392/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2392/ Thu, 02 Jul 2009 11:15:24 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2391/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2391/ Wed, 29 Apr 2009 16:03:21 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2390/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2390/ Wed, 29 Apr 2009 16:02:25 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2389/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2389/ Wed, 29 Apr 2009 16:01:06 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2388/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2388/ In historical perspective, the Kosovo war stands as a significant turning point. Within the Balkan region, Operation Allied Force marked the end of the nationalist wars of the 1990s and the beginning of a new phase of partnership and integration with the EU and NATO. In terms of the wider European security order, its repercussions were contradictory. NATO reasserted its role as Europe's leading security institution, yet Operation Allied Force also gave significant momentum to the EU's development as a quasi military body. Further afield, an immediate crisis erupted in Russo-western relations followed by renewed cooperation on the ground; the longer-term impact, however, was a lingering resentment in Moscow at NATO action. At the global level, meanwhile, Operation Allied Force appeared to symbolize the primacy of both American-led western power and of the liberal norms and values that underpinned the intervention. But this was arguably a high point: future global security crises would be managed in the context of the rising power of the non-western world, a more fragmented West and greater contestation over the norms that should underpin international society. Wed, 29 Apr 2009 16:00:06 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2387/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2387/ This article reviews the main developments in the Kosovo crisis in the context of relations between Russia and NATO/the West. For Moscow, Operation Allied Force constituted a flagrant breach of international law, a threat to post-Cold War European security governance and a challenge to Russia's status in the international order. Official Russian interpretations, heavily influenced by domestic politics, reflect a perception among Russia's political elite that, rather than upholding liberal democratic values, NATO's intervention constituted a selective defence of the interests of the leading western powers. Such views have influenced Moscow's position on the thorny question of Kosovo's independence and Russia's more assertive foreign and security policy in the recent period, not least in the conflict over South Ossetia in August 2008. Ultimately, Operation Allied Force resulted in the Russian governing elite reassessing its views on statehood, the international order and the norms underpinning international society. Wed, 29 Apr 2009 15:57:36 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2386/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2386/ Germany's role in Operation Allied Force has been described as a watershed in its foreign policy. It remains perhaps the pinnacle of Germany's security and defence policy transition after the Cold War. Germany's participation in Operation Allied Force was the first aggressive use of force by the Bundeswehr since the Second World War and, remarkably, was undertaken without a United Nations Security Council mandate. The deployment of German forces in 1999 suggested that German reluctance to burden-share in crisis management alongside NATO allies had been overcome. Yet Germany remains a cautious actor when it comes to the deployment of offensive military force. In this regard, Germany has maintained a considerable degree of continuity in its foreign and security policy after unification, a theme which this article will outline. Wed, 29 Apr 2009 15:55:08 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2385/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2385/ Operation Allied Force had a decisive impact on Tony Blair's leadership of UK foreign policy. This article begins with Blair's famous Chicago speech of April 1999; his clearest statement of an apparently underlying moral purpose in international relations. It then contrasts the conventional wisdom that over Kosovo Blair was acting out of a sense of moral obligation with a revisionist account centring on the domestic political considerations impelling Blair into this particular foreign policy adventure. Blair drew three lessons from his involvement in Operation Allied Force: that media presentation was a crucial aspect of implementing a successful foreign policy strategy; that he had been too cautious between 1997 and 1999, partly as a result of being chained to the vagaries of public opinion; and that he could generate robust and worthy foreign and defence policies sitting with his close advisers on the sofa of his 'den' in Downing Street rather than working through traditional channels. The key argument in conclusion is that there was a Tony Blair before Iraq, one who was genuinely set on building a consensus around humanitarian intervention. Wed, 29 Apr 2009 15:53:03 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2384/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2384/ The 1990s was a period of strategic innovation in US foreign policy. Operation Allied Force in particular represented an important step in the contorted evolution of America's attitude towards the use of force in the post-Cold War period. That operation demonstrated the growing influence of humanitarian concerns and the extent to which America was willing to reconsider Cold War criteria on the prudence and utility of force in support of its foreign policy. In its decision to intervene in Kosovo, the Clinton administration also divided opinion among the military. This, in effect, reduced the premium placed on the counsels of the armed forces and made it easier for the Bush administration subsequently to ignore their advice. Furthermore, having fought the war multilaterally through NATO, Operation Allied Force made America more wary of doing so again. In other words, the intervention set a number of precedents and left a significant legacy for the way in which US foreign policy was pursued in the decade that followed. This legacy is considered in two parts: the first analyses those issues associated with the use of force debate; the second considers how the Kosovo experience affected US attitudes to coalition warfare. Wed, 29 Apr 2009 15:49:13 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2383/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2383/ The Kosovo war was a decisive catalyst in the development of the EU's international security role. The escalating crisis in Kosovo confirmed that the EU was still unable to prevent, contain or end violent conflict along its own borders. This led the EU to augment both its hard and soft power through the launch of the European Security and Defence Policy and the Stabilisation and Association Process. These initiatives endowed the EU with the potential to make a distinct contribution to international conflict management. Unsurprisingly, this continuing transformation has encountered significant obstacles relating to capabilities, political will and coordination. Concerns have also been raised about how the development of a military dimension has changed the nature of EU power. However, the EU has not abandoned the core principle upon which its international role was founded, namely the need to transcend conflict. Ten years after its failings in Kosovo, the EU is assuming increasing responsibility for conflict management and becoming a more capable international security actor. Wed, 29 Apr 2009 15:46:05 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2382/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2382/ NATO has throughout its history been the subject of prognostications of crisis and dissolution. Indeed, the alliance has been written off so many times that crisis as normality has come to typify its development. In the twenty-year history of NATO's post-Cold War development, Operation Allied Force stands midway between the existential moment that was the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the current travails being experienced in Afghanistan. A comparison of NATO's experience in the Balkans and in the Afghan theatre suggests that the view of a NATO perched permanently at the edge of collapse is problematic and misleading. This is not to defend alliance actions as such but rather to suggest that the narrative of crisis and collapse makes for poor analysis and underestimates NATO's proclivity for adaptation and endurance. Wed, 29 Apr 2009 15:43:33 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2381/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2381/ Some have argued that NATO's air campaign against Serbia in 1999 was manifestly unlawful, others that it was an entirely legitimate humanitarian intervention. A third position suggests that the intervention while unlawful, in the strictest sense, was nonetheless legitimate. Here, a customary law right to intervene was seen as emerging, permitting action to prevent a mass atrocity crime, even when UN Security Council authorization was absent. Did Operation Allied Force, then, add to the case for the emergence of this new customary norm? If Kosovo achieved anything, it was to prompt greater attention to the merits of the argument in favour of a 'responsibility to protect'. If NATO's 1999 action were repeated today in a similarly unauthorized manner it would still be unlawful, but it would perhaps be seen as a legitimate means to preventing a mass atrocity crime. Wed, 29 Apr 2009 15:39:40 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2380/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2380/ This article challenges the historical amnesia surrounding the whirlwind of international recognition of the state of Kosovo. It explores three theses concerning the role of international intervention and local politics in state formation. First, the article contends that Kosovar Albanians were 'backed into' the independent state option. Second, it makes a distinction between 'parallel states' and 'parallel societies', and explores the inadequacy of the thesis that, in the case of Kosovo, a parallel entity was waiting in the wings, prepared to step up and assume the mantle of a fully operational independent state. Third, it argues that Operation Allied Force was central to the eventual recognition of the independent State of Kosovo. Wed, 29 Apr 2009 15:37:06 +0100 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2379/ http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/archive/view/-/id/2379/ This article has four objectives: first to make a case for the significance of the Kosovo war in contemporary history; second, to present an overview of the crisis itself and the military confrontation which was its consequence; third, to survey the initial controversies aroused by military action-and, specifically, the debates surrounding NATO's Operation Allied Force; and finally, to reference the longer term significance of the Kosovo war in terms of the themes covered by the remaining contributions which make up this volume. Wed, 29 Apr 2009 15:33:39 +0100